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Pitfalls in Developing Lands Burdened by Non-Participating
Royalty
Calculating the Royalty Share and Coexisting with the Duty Owed 
to the Non-Participating Royalty Owner by the Executive Interest
I.
Introduction
Non-Participating Royalty may be severed1 from the mineral 
estate,2 and when severed, only entitles the owner to its 
prescribed share of production, cost-free. The non-participating 
royalty owner does not participate in the executive right, the 
right to execute oil and gas leases, or in bonus or delay rental 
payments.3 Conveyances of non-participating royalty must be 
interpreted to determine the share of gross production that is 
conveyed or reserved. Central in determining the share of gross 
production conveyed is whether the interest created is a 
fractional share royalty or a fraction of royalty.
The difference between a non-participating fractional share 
royalty and a fraction of royalty is simple, yet illusive.
First, a fractional share royalty entitles the owner to only that 
specified fractional quantum of gross production stated in the 
deed. In essence, the effect of a fractional share conveyance of 
royalty is to transfer ”a fraction or percentage of gross 
production that stands as a free royalty."4 The share of gross 
production that the fractional share is entitled to is fixed by 
the fractional size of the interest conveyed by the deed, 
regardless of the amount of royalty contained in a subsequent oil 
and gas lease.5 For example, the language conveying "an 
undivided l/16th of all of the oil, gas, and other minerals 
produced and saved," entitles the royalty owner to a l/16th share 
of gross production regardless of the fact the landowner's 
royalty reserved in the oil and gas lease is a l/8th, 3/16th or 
l/4th royalty.6 A fractional share royalty interest does not 
participate in any overriding royalty reserved in an oil and gas 
lease, that is, in addition to the landowner's royalty.7
Conversely, a non-participating fraction of royalty conveys 
that fractional share of royalty that is contained in the oil and 
gas lease.8 For example, a 1/2 of non-participating royalty, 
with an oil and gas lease providing for a l/8th royalty, is 
entitled to a 1/16 part of gross production. Likewise, if the 
oil and gas lease provides for a 3/16th of royalty, a 1/2 of non- 
participating royalty is entitled to 3/32nds of gross production. 
In effect, the fraction of the non-participating royalty's share
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of production is not "fixed,” but "floats" in accordance with the 
size of the landowner's royalty contained in the lease.9 In 
addition to the landowner's royalty, the fraction of non- 
participating royalty also shares proportionally in any 
overriding royalty interest reserved in the oil and gas lease, if 
the interest is a royalty. Because the holder of the executive 
right negotiates the landowner's royalty share in the oil and gas 
lease, and thus, determines the quantum of royalty that the 
fraction of non-participating royalty owner receives, the 
executive owner owes a duty of care to the non-participating 
royalty owner in establishing the landowner's royalty.
Determining whether a non-participating royalty conveyance 
creates a fractional share or a fraction of royalty involves an 
issue of construction teeming with complications which increase 
the perplexity of the question. Looming large in the confusion 
is the fact that the standard landowner's royalty in the oil and 
gas lease for approximately 50 years was a l/8th share. That 
customary l\8th share furnished the background in which non- 
participating royalty interests were created during that era. 
Thus, one wanting to reserve a share of the landowner's l\8th 
royalty as, for example, 1/2 of that interest, could express it 
in either one of two ways. The reservation could be expressed as 
a fraction of royalty, i.e., 1/2 of the royalty, entitling them 
to l/16th share of gross production, or as a straight fractional 
share, a l/16th share of gross production, both of which reserved 
the same quantum of production. Thus, for many years, as a 
practical matter, a fractional share and a fraction of royalty 
were synonymous.10 In fact, as will be seen, many non- 
participating royalty interests were created by instruments that 
utilized both a fractional share and a fraction of royalty. One 
expression may be found in one clause of the deed, such as the 
granting clause, while the alternative expression will appear in 
either a "subject to" or a "future leasing" clause.
Over the last twenty years the landowner's royalty in the 
oil and gas lease has increased to a greater fractional share, 
such as a 3/16th or l/4th. Consequently, a fractional share or a 
fraction of royalty are no longer synonymous, but yield different 
shares of gross production. The fraction of designation, created 
during the era in which the l/8th landowner's royalty was all but 
universal and was the background for the transaction, yields a 
greater share of production than its historic counterpart, the 
fractional share designation.
To complicate matters, some laypersons, particularly during 
the old days when less of the populace was educated, had 
difficulty with fractions in general. Moreover, the distinction 
between these two different royalty designations is often slight 
and some laypersons, as well as lawyers, simply fail to 
comprehend the difference.
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2Delineating the Difference
The distinction between fractional share royalty interests 
and fraction of royalty interests may best be illustrated by 
examples from the case law. A common example of a fractional 
share non-participating royalty is the grant of a fraction of 
gross production or its equivalent. For example, "an undivided 
1/24 of all of the oil, gas, and other minerals produced, saved 
and made available for market" conveyed a fractional share 
royalty interest entitling the grantee to a l/24th share of gross 
production.11
The fractional share conveyance may also utilize a fraction in 
reference to "royalty" as a synonym for gross production. Thus, 
a reservation of "a l/16th royalty from any oil and gas produced" 
entitles the grantor to a l\16th share of gross production.12 
Similarly, a grant of "a fee royalty of 1/32 of the oil and gas" 
created a fractional share 1/32 interest in gross production.13
Conversely, the common example of a fraction of non- 
participating royalty is grant of a "1/2 of royalty."14 The 
quantum of gross production is the specified fraction of the 
amount of the oil and gas lease royalty. As has long been 
observed, the "fraction of royalty" designation is equivalent to 
a mathematical formula that determines the quantum of gross 
production involved.15 The term "of" that follows the fraction 
(1/2) and precedes the term "royalty" means "times" and requires 
the fraction to be multiplied by the lease royalty to determine 
the quantum of gross production. Thus, when the lease royalty is 
l/8th, 1/2 of royalty equals l/16th of gross production. Yet 
that same fraction of royalty equals 3/32 of gross production 
when the lease royalty is 3/16ths.
A fraction of royalty has also been expressed by language 
that indicates the fraction is an interest in the royalty. For 
example, a grant of a "one-half (1/2) interest in all royalties" 
conveys "one-half (1/2) of the royalty" reserved in the mining 
lease.16 Also, a deed reserving "one-half (1/2) interest in and 
to the royalty rights" reserved 1/2 of the royalty to be paid 
under any existing or future lease.17 Similarly, a reservation 
of "an equal one-eighth (l/8th) of any royalty of all oil, gas, 
*** developed on or received from said land" reserved a l/8th of 
royalty, which due to the royalty in the lease being l/8th, 
reserved a l/8th of l/8th, or a l/64th, share of gross 
production.18
3
Some Problem Areas
A. A Fraction of a l/8th Royalty
Some non-participating royalty conveyances have utilized a 
fraction of a l/8th royalty to fix the quantum of the royalty 
share. The effect is to create a fractional share royalty. For 
example, a grant of ”1/2 of the l/8th royalty (same being l/16th 
of total production)” conveys a l/16th share of gross production 
despite the fact that the lease royalty may be in excess of a 
l/8th share.19 The plain meaning of the specific language 
utilized dictates the fractional share construction. After all, 
1/2 of l/8th equals a l/16th share. The specific language of the 
grant or reservation precludes a construction of anything other 
than a fractional share of gross production. Thus, the courts 
give a literal interpretation to the fraction of l/8th non- 
participating royalty which results in a fractional share 
construction.
That result, however, has not gone unquestioned. Dean 
Ernest Smith has observed that the general intent of the parties 
to the conveyance or reservation of a fraction of a l/8th royalty 
was to convey or reserve a fraction of whatever royalty share 
that is subsequently provided for in the lease.20
In essence, under Smith’s theory, the l/8th fraction appearing 
in the formula was not only synonymous with the oil and gas 
lease royalty share but signified the lease royalty share, 
whatever that share may subsequently become. Thus, a l/4th of 
l/8th royalty would be construed as a l/4th of royalty, i.e., a 
fraction of royalty, entitling the royalty owner to share in 
lease royalty in excess of l/8th. The hypothesis for Smith's 
general intent for a fraction of royalty construction is the 
historical ubiquity of the oil and gas lease royalty as a l/8th 
share and the probability that the parties never considered the 
possibility of a lease providing for a greater royalty share. 
Smith recognizes, however, that the specificity as to the quantum 
of the share of royalty inherent in the fraction of l/8th royalty 
conveyance, i.e., the specific intent, precludes any 
contradiction of such terms by a general intent based on 
historical facts or assumptions.21 Thus, despite his qualms,
Smith recognizes that the fractional share of construction will 
prevail as the fraction of l/8th royalty formula.
Nevertheless, cases exist dealing with deeds or reservations 
of a fractional share of l/8th royalty that bear the suspicion 
that Smith's general intent theory is not far off the mark. One 
such case is Canter v. Lindsey .22 a Texas Civil Court of Appeals 
case. In that case, Dora Roberts owned the fee mineral estate to 
17,712 acres of land. In 1935, she conveyed to M C. Lindsey as 
follows:
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" ... one fourth of one eighth (1/4 of 1/8) of all the 
oil, gas, and other minerals produced from the 
following described land ... the interest herein 
conveyed being an equal one fourth of one eighth (1/4 
of 1/8) part of all of the oil, gas, and other minerals 
when same has been produced from said land, and to such 
extent, such part of any and all future productions of 
such is hereby conveyed.”
The deed also reserved to the grantor the right to all 
bonuses, delay rentals and executive rights.
Thereafter, in 1941, Roberts executed the following deed to 
J .E . Mabee:
”That I, Dora Roberts, ... do GRANT, SELL, and CONVEY 
unto the said J. E. Mabee, ..., a three-fourths (3/4) 
interest, undivided, in and to all of the oil, gas and 
other minerals, on, in, and under the certain tracts, 
parcels and pieces of land ...”
The next clause of the deed conveyed to Mabee all the rights 
to the executive, bonuses and delay rentals, "as well as all 
other benefits accruing thereunder," to the remaining l/4th 
interest.
That clause continued as follows:
"save and except the royalty payable under any such 
lease covering such l/4th interest, all royalty 
accruing under any such lease on such l/4th interest 
being payable to M. C. Lindsey, his heirs and assigns, 
who owns an undivided one-fourth (1/4)
non-participating royalty interest in the oil, gas and 
other minerals in said land."
The deed then recited that Lindsey did not own any rights to 
the executive, bonus or rentals, such rights having been retained 
by Roberts in Lindsey's deed and repeated that such rights were 
conveyed to Mabee who would then solely own all executive, bonus 
and delay rental rights. As to royalty, the instrument concluded 
by stating that Mabee would own:
"the right to receive only three-fourths (3/4) of the 
royalty accruing under any such lease, or leases, the 
remaining one-fourth (1/4) interest in such royalty 
being owned by M. C. Lindsey, his heirs and assigns."
In 1973, an oil and gas lease covering part of the land was 
executed that provided for a 3/16ths royalty and production was 
established on the lease.
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A declaratory judgment action was then instituted to 
determine the ownership of the 1/16 lease royalty share 
attributable to the l/4th of royalty interest reserved in the 
Mabee deed that was in excess of the l/8th royalty share. 
Predictably, all of the parties to the original conveyances were 
deceased but their heirs and successors-in-interest of Lindsey, 
Mabee and Roberts23 sought to recover the l/16th royalty 
share.24
Lindsey argued that he acquired the excess l/16th royalty 
share by virtue of the 1935 deed. Lindsey argued, in part, that 
the deed conveyed a l/4th of 3/16th, i.e., a 3/64th, royalty 
share in production from the 1973 lease. Lindsey prevailed at the 
trial court, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. First, the 
Court held the deed unambiguous and construed the scope of the 
conveyance to encompass only a 1/32nd fractional share non- 
participating royalty. In effect, Lindsey was conveyed a 
fractional share l/32nd royalty, not a l/4th fraction of royalty. 
Thus, Lindsey was only entitled to a l/32nd share of gross 
production regardless of the size of the landowner's royalty 
contained in the 1973 lease. The Court observed:
"The Plaintiff became entitled to a l/32nd royalty 
interest, but no more. That interest was established 
in 1935 and was absolute and independent of any royalty 
reserved in any future lease by the then holder of the 
executive rights."25
In effect, the Court in Canter literally interpreted the 
l/4th of l/8th royalty deed to convey a fractional share l/32nd 
interest.
In addition to the 1935 deed, Lindsey also claimed that the 
recitals in the 1941 Mabee deed that described, albeit 
erroneously, his royalty share as a l/4th of royalty established 
his right to a l/4th share of the 1973 lease royalty. The Court 
rejected this argument for the following reasons. First, the 
recitals in the Mabee deed that described his royalty as a l/4th 
share did not operate as a grant to Lindsey of that interest 
because of the lack of words of conveyance. Also, because the 
recitals in the Mabee deed as to Lindsey's title were erroneous 
they could not supply a basis for an exception from the grant 
that would operate as a conveyance of an interest.26 Finally, 
both of the Lindsey theories relating to the 1941 Mabee deed 
would also fail for contravening the rule that a reservation in 
favor of a stranger to the title is void.
Mabee, the grantee to the 1941 deed, claimed the excess 
royalty at issue on the theory that Roberts had conveyed to him 
everything which she owned and had not previously conveyed to 
Lindsey. The Court rejected this argument noting that even 
though Roberts was mistaken as to Lindsey's interest under the
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1935 deed, believing he owned a l/4th of royalty when he in fact 
owned a l/32nd royalty, the 1943 deed clearly and unambiguously 
reserved a l/4th of the royalty from the conveyance to Mabee.
In effect, Roberts retained that portion of the reserved interest 
that was not outstanding in another.27 Thus, as only 1/32 was 
outstanding in Lindsey, entitling him to 2/64th of the gross 
lease production, and Roberts reserved a 1/4 of royalty, being a 
l/4th of 3/16ths, or 3/64ths of such production, she owned the 
difference, being a 1/64 share of gross production.
When Canter v. Lindsev is considered in relation to Dean 
Smith’s general intent theory, one wonders if Dora Roberts 
believed that a l/4th of l/8th royalty was identical to a l/4th 
of royalty when she executed the two deeds? The Court admitted 
that she was mistaken when she executed the 1945 deed as to the 
effect of the 1935 deed. Was she also mistaken in forgetting 
that a l/4th of l/8th royalty was conveyed to Lindsey, as opposed 
to a l/4th of royalty? Or, did she simply not believe that there 
was a distinction between the two? Did she think that the 
different formulas were synonymous and conveyed the equivalent 
share in production from a future lease? She, as well as Lindsey 
and Mabee, may have labored under that delusion. In any event, 
despite however convincing one might find Smith's theory, the 
literal interpretation that results in a fractional share 
construction of a fraction of l/8th royalty prevails, absent 
additional language or circumstances dictating a different 
result.28 The plain language of the formula evidencing the 
specific intent cannot be overridden by a general intent derived 
from the historical background of the universality of the l/8th 
lease royalty and a general assumption that the fraction l/8th 
was intended to encompass any fraction of lease royalty.
2.
The Inconsistent Granting Clause:
A Fraction Of and the Minimum Royalty Provision
Brown v. Havard29 involved the construction of the following 
royalty reservation contained in a 1963 warranty deed:
"Grantors reserve ... in perpetuity an undivided one-half 
non-participating royalty (Being equal to, not less than 
an undivided l/16th) ... ."
Brown, the defendant, executed the deed in favor of the 
successors-in-interest, Havard, et al. (Havard). The land was 
then subject to an oil and gas lease providing for a l/8th 
royalty that was held during the secondary term by payment of 
shut-in-gas royalties on a gas well, the Gill No. 1. Havard, in 
1973, executed an oil and gas lease covering the entire tract
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except for the Gill No. 1 gas unit to M-Tex that provided for a 
3/8th lease royalty. M-Tex drilled four producing wells on the 
new lease. Havard then brought a declaratory judgment action 
contending that Brown only reserved a l/16th royalty in the M-Tex 
wells.30 Havard argued, inter alia, that the deed was ambiguous 
and that extrinsic evidence revealed that the parties only 
intended a reservation of a l/16th royalty. Brown contended that 
deed was unambiguous and reserved 1/2 of royalty, entitling him 
to 1/2 of the 3/8ths lease royalty. The case was tried to a jury 
which found, based on extrinsic evidence, that Brown was only 
entitled to a l/16th share of gross production. The trial judge, 
finding the deed was not ambiguous and reserved a 1/2 of royalty, 
entered a judgment nothwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), awarding 
Brown an undivided 1/2 of the lease royalty, being 3/16ths of 
gross production. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding 
the deed ambiguous, and the evidence sustaining the jury's 
determination that the parties intended only a reservation of a 
l/16th royalty. The Supreme Court of Texas, in a divided 
opinion, affirmed the Court of Appeals.
The majority of the Texas Supreme Court held the deed was 
ambiguous which permits the admission of extrinsic evidence to 
ascertain the intent of the parties. The test to determine 
whether there is an ambiguity is that after applying established 
rules of interpretation, the deed remains susceptible to more 
than one interpretation, it is ambiguous; but if only one meaning 
is clearly evident, the deed is not ambiguous.
The majority predicated its decision that the reservation 
was ambiguous on the following construction. The deed provided
"Grantors reserve ... in perpetuity an undivided
one-half non-participating royalty ... ."
The majority determined this language would reserve a 1/2 
royalty, being 1/2 of gross production, and not 1/2 of the 
royalty. However, the parenthetical phrase "Being equal to, not 
less than an undivided l/16th," had "reference to a reservation 
of royalty."
The ambiguity was contained in the parenthetical phrase.
One interpretation of "Being equal to, not less than an undivided 
1/16th" is that it reserved a l/l6th fractional share royalty.
In effect, the parties intended to reserve a 1/2 of the 
conventional l/8th royalty, "being equal to" a l/16th royalty. 
Under this interpretation, the language "not less than an 
undivided l/16th" merely provided for the contingency that if the 
lease royalty were ever reduced, the l/16th share would be 
received, insuring the reservation was a 1/2 of l/8th royalty.
The parenthetical phrase also supported an alternative 
interpretation of a reservation of 1/2 of royalties contained in
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future leases with a proviso that such share could not be less 
than l/16th. This was the argument advanced by Brown. However, 
the opinion cryptically noted that the presence of the "comma” 
between the phrase "Being equal to" and "not less than an 
undivided l/16th" must be ignored to permit this latter 
construction. In other words, in the view of the majority, the 
presence of the "comma" in the parenthetical phrase grammatically 
precludes a construction of that language as intending to convey 
a 1/2 of royalties in future leases but not less than a l/16th 
share. To achieve that construction based on that language, the 
comma, i.e., the grammatical construction, must be ignored.31 
After reviewing the extrinsic evidence admitted by the trial 
court, the majority affirmed the Court of Appeals determination 
that Brown intended to reserve a l/16th royalty share.
The dissenting opinion found the deed unambiguous and 
reserved to Brown 1/2 of royalties with a minimum royalty set at 
l/16th. The dissent interpreted the parenthetical language as 
referring to the lease in existence at the time the deed was 
executed as well as to future leases. Under the existing lease, 
which had a l/8th royalty clause, a reservation of 1/2 of 
royalties would be equivalent to a l/16th royalty. The inclusion 
of the words "not less than an undivided l/16th" only indicated 
that Brown contemplated future leases on the property after the 
existing lease expired. In the event a future lease provided for 
less than a l/8th royalty, Brown, under the parenthetical clause, 
would still be entitled to a l/16th royalty. If the future lease 
provided in excess of a l/8th royalty, Brown was to share in 1/2 
of that royalty. In effect, the draftsman was merely exercising 
caution to guarantee a certain minimum royalty.
Finally, the dissent differed on the effect of the "comma" 
in the parenthetical phrase. The dissent noted:
"There is no language anywhere in the reservation 
clause to indicate that the Browns' royalty was to be 
limited to a maximum of l/16th; there is no language to 
the effect that 1/2 of royalties is to be equal to not 
more than l/16th. The reservation does, however, 
unambiguously state that the Browns' royalty interest 
is to be not less than l/16th. Describing a variable 
amount as being equal to not less than 1/16 has the 
same result as describing it as equal to or greater 
than 1/16. The absence of a comma between the words 
"equal to" and "not less than" does not change this 
meaning. The deed reserves 1/2 of royalties, and the 
explanatory parenthetical sets a minimum of 1/16. The 
specific fractional equivalent to 1/2 of royalties may 
vary according to the lease so long as the Browns 
received their 1/16 minimum."32
Brown v. Havard illustrates some of the perplexing problems
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of construing mineral or royalty conveyances for lawyers and 
landpersons. First, one must be able to see the potential for an 
ambiguity in the deed or reservation clause, i.e., the 
susceptibility to different interpretations. However, as noted 
by the majority opinion, even if it is susceptible to two 
constructions, it is not ambiguous if one construction clearly 
predominates.
More importantly, the conclusion that the reservation was 
ambiguous may be plausible but not irresistible. After all, the 
grantor's reservation specifically specified a 1/2 non- 
participating royalty, which was intended as a 1/2 of royalty 
reservation (Brown never argued otherwise), which was followed by 
the parenthetical phrase where the majority found the ambiguity. 
When the reservation was created, an oil and gas lease with a 
l/8th royalty was in existence and the grantor could have 
intended to reserve a perpetual non-participating royalty, 
mindful that future leasing of the tract may occur. The intent 
appears evident: the language of the parenthetical phrase was to 
insure that no less than a l/16th lease royalty would ever 
devalue his perpetual royalty interest. Did he also intend the 
language "Being equal to" to confine his royalty share to a 
l/16th? What would your answer be if you did not know that the 
jury had found that the parties intended the reservation of a 
l/16th share of production?33
If in fact Brown's intent was to reserve a 1/2 of royalty 
interest with the parenthetical phrase only being added to insure 
that his royalty under any future lease would be a minimum of 
1/16 share, then the drafting of the minimum royalty provision 
that was designed to protect, in actuality, led to ruination. 
Although minimum royalty provisions may be a desirable addition 
to the fraction of royalty grant or reservation to protect the 
royalty owner from a low lease royalty negotiated by the 
executive owner, Havard points out the necessity that such 
clauses be clearly and unambiguously drafted so that the 
conveyance is to a fraction of royalty with a minimum royalty 
limitation. Otherwise, as may have been the case in Havard, that 
which was intended to help may in fact harm.
3.
The Horrors of the Double Fraction
In Palmer v. Lide.34 the Arkansas Supreme Court was 
construing a 1927 non-participating royalty deed that granted as 
follows:
"do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey ... an 
undivided one-eighth of one-eighth (1/8) interest in
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and to all of the oil gas and other mineral royalty ...
"
•
Oil production was subsequently established on the land 
under a lease providing for a l/8th landowner's royalty.
Division orders were prepared which reflected that the deed 
conveyed a l/8th of l/8th royalty, a l/64th share of gross 
production. The successors-in-interest of both the grantors 
(plaintiffs) and the grantees (defendants) executed the division 
orders and royalty was distributed to the parties on that basis 
until the operator suspended the amount subsequently disputed. 
Plaintiffs then sued to recover the suspended royalties and to 
determine their proper share of future royalties.
Plaintiffs argued that the deed conveyed a l/8th of l/8th of 
royalty, with the latter being fixed by the lease at l/8th. Thus, 
according to the plaintiffs, the deed conveyed 1/8 of 1/8 of 1/8, 
being a 1/512 share of gross production. The defendants argued 
that the deed, as reflected in the original division orders, 
conveyed l/8th of l/8th royalty, being a 1/64 production share. 
The Supreme Court, affirming the trial court, interpreted the 
deed as conveying l/8th of l/8th of the royalty, which under the 
facts was a 1/512 share of gross production. Predictably, the 
Court gave effect to the plain language of the grant. The 
language unequivocally conveyed a fraction (1/8) of a fraction 
(1/8) of a fraction (of royalty, being a l/8th share). The Court 
observed that it simply "is not possible to interpret the 
unmistakably clear language of the deed to mean l/8th of l/8th of 
the total production."35
The defendants, who had been enjoying the royalty 
overpayment occasioned by misinterpretation of the deed in the 
preparation of the division orders, also argued vainly that the 
plaintiffs were barred from claiming that the defendants were 
only entitled to receive a 1/512 production share by adverse 
possession, laches, limitations or estoppel. The Court, 
following Warmack v. Cross Co..36 held that the overpaid royalty 
owner does not acquire title by adverse possession or 
acquiescence to the interest attributed to his ownership by 
mistake by the party disbursing the proceeds of production. 
Additionally, the Court held that one who erroneously receives 
and keeps overpayment for several years is not in equity entitled 
to a continuation of the error.
One cannot quarrel with the construction of the "double 
fraction" formula by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lide and by 
other courts.37
The specific intent of the parties arising from the plain 
language of the formula is unmistakable. However, one is haunted 
by the fear that the "horrors of the double fraction" may be the 
result of an error based simply on the parties' selection of the
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wrong royalty deed form. Intending only to convey a l/8th of 
l/8th royalty, or a l/64th share of gross production, the parties 
mistakenly selected a printed form to convey a fraction of 
royalty and inserted in the blank, which is followed in the form 
by the salient of royalty language, the fraction, 1/8 of 1/8.
Had the printed form selected been for a fractional share 
conveyance, no mistake would have occurred and their intent would 
have been effectuated. Obviously, that one simple and single 
word "of," succeeded by the term "royalty," is paramount in 
establishing the quantum of the royalty share conveyed. Yet that 
simple distinction was probably lost on a lot of landowners, 
particularly in the early days of mineral conveyancing. That 
common error, like the Duhig rule of mineral conveyancing,38 has 
likely occasioned the loss of fortunes in oil and gas royalties.
4.
The Large Fractional Share
Fractional share non-participating royalties are peculiarly 
worthy of caution. The illustrative case is Gavenda v. Strata 
Energy. Inc.,39 a Texas Supreme Court case, wherein the Gavenda 
family reserved a 15-year non-participating royalty interest in a 
1967 deed. The relevant part of the deed provided:
"an undivided one-half (1/2) non-participating royalty 
of all of the oil and gas in, to and under that [sic] 
produced ... ."
Subsequently, in 1978, the predecessor-in-interest to the 
grantee, who owned the executive right to the Gavendas' non- 
participating royalty, executed an oil and gas lease providing 
for a l/8th landowner's royalty. Thereafter, Strata Energy,
Inc., and others, acquired the oil and gas lease by assignment 
and drilled two producing wells on the tract.40
Strata then hired an attorney to prepare a division order 
title opinion. The examining attorney erroneously interpreted 
the reservation in the 1967 deed as entitling the Gavenda family 
to a l/16th royalty share, as opposed to a 1/2 royalty share. 
Obviously, the attorney erroneously construed the reservation as 
a 1/2 of royalty, which would accrue 1/2 of the landowner's 
royalty which equals a l/16th of gross production. Instead, the 
deed reserved a 1/2 royalty which entitled the Gavendas' to a 1/2 
of gross production.
Based on the title opinion, Strata prepared division orders, 
which the Gavendas' executed, that provided for the disbursement 
of their share of the proceeds on a l/16th royalty share. 
Thereafter, when some of the Gavendas died and the royalty
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ownership changed, transfer orders were prepared and executed 
reflecting the l/16th royalty ownership.
Apparently, during the administration of one of the estates, 
the error was discovered. The Gavendas revoked their division 
and transfer orders two days before the term interest expired. 
Thereafter, the Gavendas' sued to recover the unpaid 7/16th 
royalty share, amounting to more than $2.4 million in unpaid 
royalties. In the litigation, the defendant lessees did not 
dispute that the deed reserved a 1/2 royalty interest, being a 
1/2 share of gross production. Instead, they argued that the 
stipulation of ownership interest contained in the division 
orders estopped the plaintiffs from claiming any royalty in 
excess of the l/16th interest.
The Supreme Court of Texas, reversing the trial court and 
the intermediate appellate court,41 held that the defendants 
were liable for the unpaid royalties prior to the revocation of 
the division orders. Historically, estoppel had been applied 
based on the stipulation of ownership interest contained in the 
division order. Such estoppel precluded the underpaid interest 
owner from recovering the deficiency from the operator who relied 
on the division order to distribute the proceeds of 
production.42 The Court reasoned, however, that estoppel is not 
applicable when the operator made the mistake because a contrary 
result would allow the operator to profit unjustly from its own 
mistake.
The opinion recognized that the attorney who misconstrued 
the royalty reservation was being sued for malpractice but, as 
the attorney was the agent of the defendants, his negligence was 
imputed to them.
5.
Inconsistency in the Granting, Subject To 
and Future Leasing Clauses
Early non-participating royalty deed forms, and occasionally 
formally drafted royalty reservations, paralleling early mineral 
deeds, often contained multiple clauses in which different 
fractions could be inserted. The granting clause designates the 
quantum of the estate conveyed in the deed. The "subject to" 
clause recites that the interest conveyed was subject to an 
outstanding oil and gas lease and specifies the lease benefits that 
are covered and included in the grant.43 The "future-lease" 
clause specifies the ownership interests conveyed under future 
leases after the existing lease has expired.
The practice of specifying the interests conveyed under 
existing and future leases in the "subject to" and "future-lease"
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clauses is attributed to an early ill-fated Texas case. Caruthers 
v . Leonard44 held that the grantee of a fractional interest in a 
mineral estate that was subject to a pre-existing oil and gas lease 
did not receive a right to his proportionate share of the benefits 
under the lease. Caruthers was obviously bad law; its holding was 
inconsistent with the basic common law principle of conveyancing, 
namely that which is not specifically reserved from the grant is 
conveyed. Eventually, some fourty years later Caruthers was 
overruled.45 In the absence of Caruthers, a "subject to" clause 
is only required to prevent the grantor from breaching the 
covenants of title when the mineral estate conveyed is burdened by 
a pre-existing oil and gas lease.
Deeds drafted to require the parties to fill in separate 
clauses, some of which relate to the different incidents of mineral 
ownership, such as the "subject to" and "future-lease" provisions, 
are obviously susceptible to errors that present perplexing issues 
of judicial interpretation. The focus of our inquiry is the 
problem which occurs when the clauses utilize both a fractional 
share and a fraction of royalty. However, the resolution of this 
issue has been intertwined with the most common problem of 
construction involving inconsistencies between the "subject to" and 
"future lease" clauses and granting clauses, the dilemma of 
disparate fractions relating to mineral and royalty interests.
The problem of construction of these multiple provision deeds 
is attributable to the misconception of the parties, particularly 
as to early conveyances, as to the whether a mineral or royalty 
estate is being conveyed. Rooted in the problem was the widespread 
confusion relating to the difference between mineral and royalty 
fractional shares as they relate to the share of production 
attributable to such fractional interests. For example, a l/16th 
of a mineral estate only entitled the grantee to a l/16th of the 
conventional l/8th lease royalty, being a 1/128 production share; 
while a 1/2 mineral estate entitled the grantee to a 1/2 of the 
l/8th royalty, being a l/16th royalty share. Failing to fully 
understand this distinction, the parties intending to convey a 1/2 
mineral estate, focusing on the l/16th share of royalty, may have 
erroneously inserted the l/16th fraction in the granting clause 
drafted to convey a mineral estate, while inserting the 1/2 
fraction in the subject to or future lease clause.46
A. The Texas Cases: The Decline. Fall and 
Resurrection of the Multiple Grant Construction
The legacy of some early and highly criticized Texas cases47 
that construed deeds as effectuating "two grants," or more, 
continues to play a prominent, yet equivocal role, in the Texas 
case law which deals with inconsistencies between the granting, 
"subject to," and "future lease" clauses in mineral and royalty
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deeds. The "two grant" approach is that if the benefits conferred 
on the grantee in the "subject to" clause or the "future lease" 
clause differ from the benefits derived from the interest conveyed 
in the granting clause, then the former clause is construed as 
conveying, along with but independent of the latter clause, the 
benefits conferred therein. In effect, such a deed conveys not 
one, but two or more grants.
If the "two grant" construction prevails, then a royalty deed 
with a granting clause conveying a "l/32nd of the oil and gas in 
and under and that may be produced and saved" and a "future lease" 
clause that recites that the grantee owns a "l/4th of the 
royalties" under "future leases" conveys two separate and distinct 
interests; a l/32nd fractional share royalty applicable to the 
existing lease and a "l/4th of royalties" under subsequent leases. 
The "l/4th of royalties" clause entitles the grantee to its 
proportionate share of royalties in the future lease in excess of 
the conventional l/8th landowner's royalty.
Although some early Texas cases applied the "two grant" theory 
in some oil and gas deed construction cases,48 the theory was not 
applied to cases involving conflicting fractions in mineral or 
royalty deeds. The traditional "four corners" rule of 
construction,49 involving conventional rules of interpretation to 
ascertain the intent, was utilized.
However, in Farmers Canal Co. v. Potthast.50 a 1979 Texas 
Civil Appeals Court case, was decided under the "four corners" 
standard, and hindsight reveals that the decision was a harbinger 
of what was to come. The case dealt with the construction of a 
1945 non-participating royalty deed in which the granting clause 
conveyed "a l/4th interest in and to all of the ... oil royalty, 
gas royalty, ... ." A "future lease" clause also recited:
"It is distinctly understood and herein stipulated and 
agreed . . . that Grantee shall only receive one-fourth 
(l/4th) of the money royalty on sulphur ... and 
one-fourth (l/4th) of the one-eighth (l/8th) royalty on 
oil, gas and all other minerals provided for in such 
lease or leases; and in the event Grantors, their heirs, 
or assigns, in the status of the fee owners of the 
minerals shall operate and develop the minerals therein, 
Grantee, his heirs and assigns, shall own and be entitled 
to receive as a free royalty an undivided 
one-thirty-second (l/32nd) of all of the sulphur, oil, 
gas and other minerals produced, saved and sold off the 
premises;"
Apparently the land was not leased until 1972, when 
plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the grantors, executed an oil 
and gas lease that provided for a l/6th royalty on oil and gas. 
Production was established on the lease.
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Plaintiffs sought a construction of the deed to determine that 
the deed only conveyed a l/4th of l/8th royalty. Naturally, the 
defendants, the successors-in-interest of the grantees, argued that 
the deed conveyed a l/4th of royalty which entitled them to l/4th 
of a l/6th royalty share. The court held that the grantees were 
conveyed a l/4th of royalty and the defendants were entitled to a 
l/24th share of gross production.
In so holding, the Court recited the standard rule of deed 
construction, the “four corners” rule, seeking the intention of the 
parties by considering all language appearing therein, and 
harmonizing, if possible, those provisions which appear to 
conflict. The Court, however, also recited and applied other rules
construction: construing the deed against the grantor if doubt*p232X 
exits as to the intention of the parties; and, if there is a 
"necessary repugnance” of clauses in the conveyance, the granting 
clause prevails. Thus, since the granting clause specified a grant 
of l/4th of royalty, while the future leasing clause restricted the 
royalty to l/4th of l/8th, the granting clause prevailed, and the 
deed conveyed a l/4th of royalty.
Subsequently, in 1984, the Supreme Court in Alford v. Krum51 
adopted the "repugnancy to the grant" theory to resolve 
inconsistencies between the granting, subject to, and future lease 
clauses. The case involved the construction of a 1929 deed in 
which the granting clause conveyed a 1/2 of l/8th mineral interest, 
the "subject to" clause provided for a l/16th of royalty under the 
existing lease, and the "future lease" clause provided:
"in the event that the said above described lease for any 
reason becomes cancelled or forfeited, . . . the lease 
interests and all future rentals on said land, for oil, 
gas and mineral privileges shall be owned jointly by 
. ..[Grantors and Grantees] . . . each owning a one-half 
interest in all oil, gas and other minerals in and upon 
said land, together with one-half interest in all future 
rents." (Emphasis added.)
The lease in effect at the time the deed was executed had expired.
The trial court construed the deed as conveying a l/16th 
mineral estate (1/2 of l/8th). The Court of Appeals, emphasizing 
the language of the future leasing clause, reversed the trial 
court, holding that the deed conveyed a 1/2 mineral estate. In a 
divided opinion, the Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, 
held that the deed conveyed a l/16th mineral estate.
The holding of the majority was premised on the rule of 
construction that when irreconcilable conflict between the granting 
clause and other clauses in the deed exists, the granting clause 
prevails. The majority reasoned that when an irreconcilable 
conflict precludes a harmonization of internally inconsistent
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expressions of intent, the granting clause, which contains the 
"controlling language" and the "key expression of intent," 
prevails. Further, the majority observed that the "well 
established" purpose of the future lease clause is to "explain or 
restate" the operative effect of the grant contained in the 
granting clause when the present lease terminates and future leases 
are executed. Finally, the majority emphasized that the language 
of the granting clause was clear and specific while the language of 
the future lease clause was unclear.
The dissent, by Chief Justice Pope, offered the following 
analysis of the deed. The granting clause first conveyed a 1/2 of 
l/8th or a l/16th mineral estate. The "subject to" clause then 
recognized the existence of an outstanding oil and gas lease and 
expressly subjected the l/16th conveyance to the outstanding lease. 
The dissent then noted that the majority had also held that the 
deed presently conveyed the "possibility of reverter" to that 
l/16th interest upon termination of the lease. Up to this point in 
this analysis, the dissent noted that there was no disagreement 
with the majority.
The disagreement related to the "future lease" clause which 
the dissent viewed as conveying a "different and a greater estate" 
upon termination of the outstanding lease. According to the 
dissent, "the ridgepole that divides the rights conveyed before 
reverter from those conveyed after reversion" was the language that 
upon cancellation of the outstanding lease "the lease interests and 
all future rentals on the land shall be owned jointly ...[by the 
grantors and grantees] ... each owning a one-half interest in the 
oil, gas and other minerals ... ." The dissent further noted that 
there is no ambiguity in a deed that grants a l/16th mineral estate 
so long as there is an outstanding lease and a 1/2 mineral estate 
upon the lease's termination. The fractions are different, the 
dissent stated, for a good reason.52
Even though the deed was construed to contain "multiple 
grants," the dissent also emphasized the applicability of the "four 
corners" rule of construction.53. More importantly, the multiple 
grants recognized by the dissent involve first the conveyance of 
a mineral estate, which fluctuates in size according to time, and 
secondly the grant of an undivided l/16th interest when the land 
was burdened by an outstanding lease, and, thirdly, a subsequent 
grant of an undivided 1/2 interest when the lease expired.54
Two points emerge from Alford. One is that the majority's 
adoption of the rule "repugnant to the grant" construction. This 
rule provides that the granting clause prevails over the "subject 
to" and "future lease" provisions when an irreconcilable conflict 
between former and latter clauses exists. This rule has some 
advantages; namely simplicity of application and certainty of 
title. Many deeds with disparate fractions as to mineral or 
royalty interests arising from the inclusion of a "subject to" or
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"future lease" clause do present irreconcilable conflicts, 
impossible of internal harmonization, with the granting clause. 
Thus, a title examiner can often determine the scope of the 
conveyance without resort to litigation.
The disadvantage of this reasoning is that it is an arbitrary 
rule of construction that may not reflect the intent of the parties 
because it exalts the physical location of one clause over another 
clause that may be more expressive of intent. However, the reign 
of Alford was short-lived.55 In 1991, the Texas Supreme Court in 
Luckel v. White.56 another divided opinion, reversed the 
"repugnancy to the grant" rule of construction, specifically 
overturning Alford.
Luckel involved the construction of a 1935 royalty deed. 
Mayes, the grantor, conveyed a royalty interest to Luckel by a deed 
in which the granting, habendum, and warranty clauses recited that 
a l/32nd fractional share royalty was conveyed. The "subject to" 
and "future lease" clauses stated that the grantee was entitled to 
receive "l/4th of any and all royalties."57 When the deed was 
executed, the land was subject to an oil and gas lease providing 
for a l/8th royalty that had subsequently expired. Many years 
later, the land was subject to numerous leases, some of which 
provided for a l/6th royalty. A declaratory judgment action was 
brought to determine if the successors-in-interest of the grantee, 
Luckel, were entitled to a l/32nd or a l/4th of l/6th share of 
gross production from the excess royalty clauses.
The majority opinion applied the "four corners" rule of 
construction, which ascertains the intent of hte parties by 
attempting to harmonize all parts of the deed, only striking down 
a part of the deed when an irreconcilable conflict with another 
part of the instrument destroys its effect. The majority 
ascertained the intent of the parties by harmonizing the conflict 
between the granting clause and the "future lease" clause as 
follows: the granting clause conveyed a l/32nd interest (or l/4th 
of the royalty under the existing lease) until the existing lease 
expired; and, the "future lease" clause presently conveyed the 
possibility of reverter as to l/4th of royalties. Thus, as to 
future leases, the latter clause conveyed a l/4th of the total 
reserved royalty. Since the harmonization of the Mayes-Luckel deed 
conflicted with the construction of the deed in Alford, the latter 
case was expressly overruled. The Court further held that the 
outright grant of an l/32nd fixed royalty in the granting clause 
did set the minimum of the royalty for the l/4th royalty conveyed 
pursuant to the "future lease" clause.
Luckel v. White resurrected the "two grant" doctrine in Texas 
deed construction.58 Although the language of the "four corners" 
rule of construction, harmonizing all clauses of the instrument, if 
possible, is present, the recognition of, as well as the emphasis 
on, the two separate and distinct grants emerging from the granting
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clause and the "future lease" clause is inescapable. Also, as the 
granting clause conveyed a l/32nd fractional royalty share under 
the exiting lease and the "future lease" clause conveyed a l/4th of 
royalty as to the "possibility of reverter" which would become 
possessory, apparently, upon the execution of the future lease, a 
conveyance of simultaneous interests,59 which are differing only 
as to the quantum of the share conveyed and the time in which the 
interests become possessory. That is a rather sophisticated theory 
as to the subject matter of the parties to a 1935 royalty deed. 
The criticism of Luckel v. White, which is the enduring criticism 
of the "two grant" theory, is that its unlikely the parties 
intended two separate grants in the deed. As stated by the 
dissenting opinion:
"The oft-repeated expression that a grantor has the power 
to convey by one instrument different interests in the 
possibility of reverter and under the subsisting lease 
should not obscure the fact that very few grantors really 
intend to convey interests of different magnitude."60
If flawed theory of Luckel does not necessarily make the 
result wrong. The result is the same as if the deed had been 
construed against the grantor. However, the dissent disagreed with 
the result as well as the "two grant" rationale. The dissent would 
have taken judicial notice of the fact that the standard lease 
royalty in 1935 was a l/8th share. The parties did not then 
contemplate that a l/4th of royalties might not always equal a 
l/32nd production share. The granting clause intended to convey a 
permanent grant of a l/32nd royalty interest. The "future lease" 
clause's "l/4th of royalties" was only used to extend the l/32nd 
production share to future leases.
Despite the lack of enthusiasm of the resurrection of the "two 
grant" doctrine to mineral and royalty conveyances, no one mourned 
the loss of Alford except, of course, title examiners who 
determined ownership on the basis of the "repugnancy to the grant 
theory" and their clients who made investments in mineral and 
royalty titles in reliance on Alford.
B. The Arkansas Cases
Barret v. Kuhn.61 is the first Arkansas Supreme Court case 
construing a non-participating royalty deed that contained both a 
fractional share and a fraction of royalty. The royalty deeds at 
issue were executed in the 1940's when there was no production on 
the land. The deeds were entitled "Royalty Deeds" and underneath 
was printed the term "non-participating." The granting clause 
provided:
"do hereby grant ... an undivided one sixty-fourth (1/64)
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interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other 
minerals, in, under and upon the following described 
lands ...”
Following the granting clause was a "minimum royalty"62 clause 
that the Court referred to a "royalty" clause:
"Provided, that the grantors herein expressly covenants 
with the grantee that no oil and gas mining lease shall 
ever be executed covering the above land, or any part 
thereof, that shall reserve to the grantors herein, their 
heirs and assigns, as royalty, less than one-eighth of 
all of the oil and gas produced and saved from said land 
and this covenant shall be deemed a covenant running with 
the land."
Following the "minimum royalty" clause was an "intention" 
clause which the court also treated as part of the "royalty" 
clause:
"It is the intention of the parties hereto that the 
grantee herein, its successors or assigns, shall be 
entitled to receive hereunder one-eighth of all oil 
and/or gas run to the credit of the royalty interest 
reserved under and by virtue of any oil and gas mining 
lease now in force and effect ..., and under any oil and 
gas mining lease hereafter executed ... ." (Emphasis 
added.)
Additionally, after the royalty clause was a "production" 
clause:
"and in any event, the grantee herein, its successors or 
assigns, shall be deemed the owner of and shall be 
entitled to receive l/64th of all oil and gas produced 
and saved from the said land ... ."
Thereafter, the plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the 
grantors, and owners of the executive right, executed oil and gas 
leases that provided for overriding royalties of either l/8th or 
l/16th in addition to a l/8th landowner's royalty. After 
production was established on the land, division orders were 
prepared that provided for the owners of the non-participating 
royalty, the grantees, to share in the overriding royalty as well 
as the lease royalty. Litigation ensued to determine the proper 
division of the royalty and overriding royalties between the 
plaintiffs and defendants.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the 
Chancellor, held that the nonparticipating royalty owners were only 
entitled to a l/64th share of production which precluded their 
participation in the overriding royalty. The Court reasoned that
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the granting clause, as further evidenced by the language of the 
"production clause," conveyed only a l/64th interest in the oil, 
gas and minerals produced. This interpretation clearly limited the 
claim of the nonparticipating royalty owners because if they were 
to participate in the overriding royalty interest, they would 
receive more than a l/64th interest. In effect, the Court 
construed the deed as granting a fractional royalty interest.
The rationale for this result can be premised on the 
applicability of the rule of construction that the granting clause, 
specifying the fractional share, controls over the inconsistent 
"royalty clause," with its fraction of royalty language. In 
effect, the "repugnancy to the grant" rule of construction was 
applied. But the case can also be read as holding that the 
fraction of language in the "royalty clause" was only intended by 
the parties to permit the royalty owners only to participate in the 
l/8th lease royalty.63
Anadarko Petroleum Co. v. Venable.64 a 1993 Arkansas Supreme 
Court case, also involved the construction of non-participating 
royalty deeds containing conflicting fractional share and fraction 
of royalty clauses. Because the deeds are identical in form, 
differing only as to the fractional shares conveyed, the discussion 
will focus exclusively on one deed, the "Royal" deed.
The deed was executed in 1939 when the lands were then subject 
to an existing oil and gas lease, the Tissue lease, that provided 
for a one-eighth royalty. The deed contained the following 
granting clause
"the grantee shall at all time subsequent to the 
execution of this instrument, receive a 13/1920ths part 
of all oil, gas and other minerals produced and saved 
from the above described land, ... which provision and 
agreement is a covenant which shall run with the 
land... ."
The deed then contained the following subject to clause which 
the Court described as a "second" granting clause:
"It is understood that this land is encumbered with an 
oil and gas lease, executed by J.G. Tissue, a widower, as
Lessors, to Record Owners as Lessee, on ______ , which
lease is recorded in Book ______ , at Page _____ , ... .
And for the same consideration the Grantors do hereby 
bargain, grant, sell, convey and set over onto the 
Grantee an undivided 13/240ths part of all royalties on 
oil or gas produced from the above described lands during 
the term of said lease, or any extension thereof." 
(Emphasis added).
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Thereafter, in the 1980's, sometime after the expiration of 
the Tissue lease, the mineral owners executed oil and gas leases 
that provided for a 3/16th royalty (with l/16th of that share 
apparently being an overriding royalty).65 The defendant, Anadarko 
Petroleum Co., the lessee, drilled producing wells on the leased 
lands. In 1983, the plaintiffs, the successors-in-interest of the 
grantees, executed division orders in favor of the defendant. The 
defendant was disbursing the proceeds from production and had 
calculated their royalty share as a straight 13/1920th share of 
production which was equivalent to payment on a l/8th royalty 
basis.
In 1991, the plaintiffs sued the defendant in Chancery Court 
to establish their right to participate in the royalty on a 3/16th 
basis. The Arkansas Supreme Court, affirming the holding of the 
Chancellor below, interpreted the 1939 deed as granting a fraction 
of royalty which permitted the plaintiffs to share in the royalty 
on a 3/16ths basis.
The Court's holding was premised on two bases. First, the 
quantum of royalty granted in the deed had to be determined by 
reading the straight fractional share grant of the "first" granting 
clause in conjunction with the "second" granting clause's grant of 
a fraction of royalty. In so doing, the Court rejected the 
defendant's argument that the fraction of royalty contained in the 
second granting clause was merely "explanatory" of the scope of the 
fractional share conveyed in the first granting clause. The Court 
reasoned that the language of the second granting clause "utilized 
all the terms of art of conveyance,"i.e ., words of grant, and 
granted an "additional fractional one-eighth of" that initially 
conveyed in the lease.
Additionally, the defendant argued that the language of the 
second granting clause, "during the term of said lease or any 
extension thereof." indicated that the parties did not contemplate 
that clause being applicable to "future leases." The Court 
rejected that argument, affirming the Chancellor's finding that the 
subsequently executed oil and gas leases were an "extension" of the 
previously expired Tissue lease. Therefore, subject to the second 
granting clause, the grant of a fraction of royalty, required 
payment of royalties on the 3/16th basis.
Despite the fact that the deed contained two granting clauses 
(the Court emphasized and interpreted the second granting clause as 
intending to effectuate a conveyance), the case does not follow the 
"two grant" theory of Luckel v. White. In effect, applying the 
"four corners" rule of construction, the Court found that the 
parties to the conveyance intended the latter fraction of "royalty 
clause" to control over the former fractional share clause.
Moreover, the Court held that the plaintiff's execution of the 
division order, which calculated their royalty share on a l/8th
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basis, did not preclude recovery from the defendant for the 
underpayment occasioned by the failure to pay royalty on the 3/16th 
basis. Although the Court recognized the general rule that the 
purchaser of production may rely on the division order in making 
payment to the interest owners and not be liable in tort or 
contract for underpayment, it refused to apply the rule. The Court 
refused to apply the rule for three reasons. First, the division 
order did not specifically indicate plaintiff's ratification or 
waiver of the right to challenge the calculation of his ownership 
share. Second, plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the 1980 leases, 
providing for the 3/16th royalty share, prior to filing suit 
precluded applicability of the doctrine of estoppel and laches. 
And thirdly, the record was devoid of any evidence regarding any 
payments made by Anadarko that interjected the rights of innocent 
third parties.
The rationale and holding as to the failure of the division 
order to protect an operator paying royalty pursuant to its terms 
are difficult to determine from the opinion. One would assume from 
the facts that Anadarko was making the excess royalty share 
payment, a l/16th share, to the owners of the mineral estate who 
were burdened by the plaintiff's non-participating royalty 
interest. If so, pursuant to Gavenda, the operator was not 
unjustly enriched, and according to traditional theory,67 should 
not have been liable for the period prior to plaintiff's revocation 
of the division order.
II.
The Duty of Care the Executive Right Owes 
to the Non-Participating Royalty Owner
The problem that peculiarly68 haunt non-participating 
royalty interests to a fraction of royalty69 is that the owners 
of such interests do not participate in the leasing of the land 
which determines the quantum of lease royalty that they will 
receive from production. The owner of the executive right to the 
mineral estate negotiates and executes the oil and gas lease 
which fixes the amount of bonus, delay rentals and royalty to be 
paid under the lease. Thus, absent a judicial standard 
regulating the conduct owed by the owner of the executive right 
to the non-participating royalty owner, the latter would be at 
the mercy of the former as to the share of royalty he will 
receive under the lease.
Typically, but not always,70 the owner of the mineral 
estate burdened by the non-participating royalty interest owns 
the executive right, as well as the right to the bonus and delay 
rental payments. Additionally, the mineral owner may also own
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the remaining share of royalty, if any, which has not been 
severed by prior non-participating royalty conveyances. An 
inherent conflict will exist between the mineral owner who owns 
no interest, or a partial interest in the royalty and the non- 
participating royalty owner over the negotiation of the lease 
terms. The non-participating royalty owner wants the maximum 
lease royalty. The mineral owner, however, has the incentive71 
to negotiate for a reduced lease royalty to maximize bonus72 and 
delay rental payments. Likewise, looking for a future leasing 
opportunity and an additional bonus, the mineral owner may 
bargain for a lower royalty to obtain a shorter primary term. 
Finally, if the mineral owner also owns the surface, the lease 
royalty may be sacrificed for surface damage or non-development 
clauses.
The protection of the non-participating royalty owner lies 
in the standard of care imposed on the owner of the executive 
interest in negotiating lease benefits on behalf of the executive 
and non-executive interests.73 The evolution of that standard 
has not been uniform or without controversy.74 The prevailing 
standards have been the traditional "utmost fair dealing," 
sometimes referred to as the "prudent landowner" standard, and 
the "fiduciary standard" originating in the 1985 Texas case of 
Manges v . Guerra.75
A. The Utmost Fair Dealing Standard
The "utmost fair dealing"76 standard measures the duty the 
mineral owner owes to the non-participating royalty owner in 
executing the oil and gas lease. This standard is what a 
"reasonable prudent landowner" owning the full mineral fee, and 
not burdened by the outstanding non-participating royalty 
interest, would have done under the circumstances. The "utmost 
fair dealing" standard has traditionally been viewed as an 
intermediate standard between an unduly high fiduciary duty and 
an insufficiently low duty of good faith.7 The "utmost fair 
dealing" standard is premised on an implied covenant in the deed 
that severs the non-participating royalty interest from the 
mineral estate.78
The standard implicitly recognizes that a mineral owner 
burdened by a fraction of non-participating royalty is entitled 
to pursue his self-interest in negotiating the bonus, delay 
rentals and other advantageous lease terms. The mineral owner is 
not obliged to subordinate his interest to the interest of the 
non-participating royalty owner. However, the mineral owner 
cannot unduly benefit at the expense of the non-participating 
royalty owner in exercising the executive right.
The extent that the mineral owner can act in pursuing his
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self-interest at the expense of the non-participating royalty 
owner is limited by the "prudent landowner” standard. If the 
reasonable prudent landowner, not burdened by the outstanding 
interest, would have negotiated the same deal that the mineral 
owner negotiated, the mineral owner bears no liability. However, 
if that reasonable prudent landowner negotiates a deal more 
favorable to the royalty owner, the mineral owner is liable.79
In sum, the "utmost fair dealing" standard examines the 
fairness of the lease royalty share to the non-participating 
royalty owner in relation to the other lease benefits obtained by 
the mineral owner. This stand is what an objective reasonable 
"prudent landowner," owning the full mineral fee, would have 
bargained for.80
The "utmost fair dealing" standard is criticized for failing 
to provide adequate guidance and predictability in determining 
whether the mineral owner in rejecting or accepting a lease 
proposal will violate the standard. For example, assume that a 
mineral owner who owns no royalty is offered two lease proposals. 
The first is an offer to lease for a $500 dollar per acre bonus 
and a l/8th royalty. The second lease offer is for a $250 per 
acre bonus and a 3/16th royalty. The nearest production is one 
mile away and two dry holes have been drilled on the tract over 
30 years ago. The well logs on the old dry holes are missing, if 
they ever existed. Seismic operations have been conducted in the 
area but the data is confidential to the proprietor and 
unavailable to the mineral owner. What's an objective "prudent 
landowner" owning the full mineral fee to do? How does a lawyer 
advise the mineral owner who desires to make the right decision,
i.e., take the $500 per acre bonus, but who also wants to avoid 
the reasonable likelihood of litigation and, more importantly, 
the possibility of liability?
A commonly expressed view is that if the lease royalty 
negotiated by the executive is equal to the going royalty rate in 
the area, no violation of the "utmost fair dealing" standard will 
likely occur.81 Conversely, a lease royalty of less than the 
going rate in the area portends a violation of the standard.
Under these circumstances, the "utmost fair dealing" standard may 
reflect reality if all influences on leaseg terms in the area are 
equal, i.e., the primary term offered, the desirability and 
availability of surface damage or non-development clauses, and if 
all lands in the area are reasonably in equal proximity to 
drilling operations or production. Any change in any of the 
above facts may affect the royalty bargained for by an executive 
as to any particular tract. Thus, th royalty share negotiated by 
landowners in the area is not dispositive, nor necessarily 
relevant, to the royalty share that the "prudent landowner" would 
have bargained for. Perhaps, the more accurate statement of 
conventional wisdom is that a lease royalty that is less than the 
going lease royalty rate should foreshadow litigation.
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Another criticism of the prudent landowner standard is that 
it is inherently inconsistent. The standard permits the 
executive to pursue his self interest, however, in pursuing that 
self interest he cannot benefit himself at the expense of the 
non-executive. Even though the apparent inconsistency may render 
the standard difficult to apply, the reason the standard 
emphasizes both the mineral owner's self interest and protection 
of the non-executive, is simple to explain. The mineral owner 
owns the right to the bonus, and like any other rational property 
owner, he should be free to secure the maximum return obtainable 
from his property. However, he also negotiates the lease 
royalty share for the non-participating royalty owner. Thus, 
some limitation on the mineral owner's right to pursue his self 
interest to the detriment of the non participating royalty owner 
in the exercise of the executive right is required. The "prudent 
landowner" standard, i.e., the "utmost fair dealing" standard, 
attempts to balance the irreconcilable interests of the mineral 
owner and the non-participating royalty owner.
Finally, the standard is viewed by some as being 
insufficient to protect the interests of the non-executive owner 
from the rapacity, or lack of altruism, of the owner of the 
executive interest.82 The executive owner controls the 
interests of the non-executive and determines their share in the 
lease benefits. Therefore, a more stringent standard of care 
than that reflected in the "utmost fair dealing" standard should 
be imposed on the executive, regardless of the whatever 
proprietary interest the latter may also have in the mineral 
estate.
B. The Fiduciary Duty
Manges v. Guerra83 held that the owner of the executive 
right to a non-participating mineral interest, who also owned a 
share of the mineral estate, owed a fiduciary duty84 to the non-
executive interests. Manges, the executive, violated the 
fiduciary duty by leasing85 in excess of 25,000 acres to himself 
for a ten year primary term, at a nominal bonus ($5 inclusive),
$2 per acre annual delay rentals and a l/8th royalty. By the 
lease, Manges acquired the 7/8ths working interests.86 Shortly 
thereafter, Manges farmed-out the lease to a third-party, 
retaining a 50% of the working interest, cost-free.
The fiduciary duty recognized in Manges is specifically 
based on the relationship of the parties, and not on a contract 
implied in the deed. The fiduciary duty imposed in Manges 
required the executive to acquire for the non-executive every 
benefit that he exacts for himself. Manges through his self- 
dealing, gained "special benefits." The 7/8 working interest from 
the Manges to Manges lease and the 1/2 cost-free working interest
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from the farm out were not shared with his non-executives. In 
addition to actual damages, the non-participating mineral owners 
were entitled to cancellation of the Manges to Manges lease and 
exemplary damages.87 However, their election to sue for damages 
precluded the remedy of cancellation of Manges' executive 
right.88
The extent to which Manges elevated the standard of care 
owed by the executive to the non-executive in the management of 
the mineral estate is unclear. A fiduciary duty implies a more 
stringent standard than exists under the "utmost fair dealing" 
standard. The fiduciary standard implicitly suggests that the 
executive's right to pursue his own self interest is limited or 
proscribed.
However, the fiduciary duty was imposed in Manges under 
circumstances in which a cotenancy existed in the mineral estate 
between the executive and non-executive interests. Manges owned 
an undivided 1/2 mineral estate and the executive right to the 
1/2 non-participating mineral estate. The fiduciary duty 
required the executive to acquire for the non-executive every 
benefit that he exacted for himself. The procurement of benefits 
that profit only the executive interest incurs liability. The 
pursuit of self interest by the executive at the expense of the 
non-executive is actionable. But, a fiduciary duty requiring 
participation on a proportionate ownership basis in all the lease 
benefits is appropriate when the executive and non-executive 
interests share a cotenancy relationship in the mineral estate. 
There is no necessity to recognize or protect the pursuit of self 
interest that results in a division of lease benefits unrelated 
to the proportional ownership interests.
When a mineral owner burdened by a fraction of non- 
participating royalty interest exercises the executive right, 
both parties do not share on a proportional ownership basis in 
all the lease benefits. The relationship is unlike the cotenancy 
relationship in Manges. The mineral owner is entitled to the 
bonus, delay rental payments and only a partial share, if any, of 
the lease royalty. The non-participating royalty owner 
participates only in his share of lease royalty. Thus, the 
mandate of the fiduciary duty in Manges, the acquisition of 
identical benefits for the non-executive when the executive 
negotiates the lease, cannot be applied when the non-executive is 
a non-participating royalty owner.
That does not mean, however, that Manges has not raised the 
standard of care that the mineral owner owes to the non- 
participating royalty owner. Rather than the contractual basis 
as the source of the duty owed, it is now the relationship of the 
parties from which the duty arises. The remedies, such as 
exemplary damages and lease cancellation, that accompany the 
fiduciary standard, and that were applied in Manges, are more
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drastic. The exact standard the fiduciary duty imposes on the 
mineral owner exercising the executive right to the non- 
participating royalty interest has been the subject of some 
speculation. One view is that the fiduciary duty prohibits the 
executive from "acting against the non-executive's interest" and 
requires him to "act affirmatively to protect the non-executive's 
interest."89 Another view is that the executive is analogous to 
a "trustee" who is also the "life beneficiary" of the trust,
"who can take his own interest into account in making decisions 
when administering the trust ... but cannot take unfair advantage 
... by making decisions that ... substantially disadvantage or 
effectively destroy the remainder interest."90 Under the latter 
view, the executive would be entitled to take his own interest 
into account, the right to bonus and delay rentals, so long as 
his decisions were in good faith and did not substantially 
disadvantage the royalty owner.91
Hopefully, if Manges elevated the standard of care that the 
mineral owner owes to the fraction of non-participating royalty 
interest in the exercise of the executive right, the new standard 
will not unduly limit or proscribe the mineral owner's self 
interest in negotiating the lease bonus, delay rentals and other 
lease benefits, such as a surface damages. Requiring the mineral 
owner to subordinate his interest to a reasonable bonus or 
surface damage protection will diminish his property interest and 
violate the intent of the parties to the deed of severance.92
Despite the uncertainty that lingers as to the effect of 
Manges on the standard of care, no one doubts that the case has 
obviously expanded the remedies available to the non-executive, 
including the non-participating royalty owner. The remedies are 
now premised on a breach of the fiduciary duty, as opposed to a 
breach of the implied contract of the "utmost fair dealing" 
standard. Exemplary damages, cancellation of either the lease or 
the executive right, or both, imposition of a resulting or 
constructive trust, all familiar to the law of fiduciaries, are 
now applicable.93
However, the Texas Civil Appellate Courts have not read 
Manges as dictating a wholesale riddance of the "utmost fair 
dealing" standard with its prudent landowner test. Emphasizing 
that Manges did involve cotenants to a mineral interest where the 
executive owner determined by leasing the share of royalty, bonus 
and delay rentals received by the non-participating mineral 
owners, the appellate courts have limited the fiduciary duty of 
Manges to instances in which the executive "controls" the amount 
of lease benefits received by a non-executive owner.94 Thus, 
the fiduciary duty of Manges is imposed on the mineral owner with 
the executive right to a fraction of non-participating royalty95 
and mandates, at least,96 that the owner of the latter interest 
receive their proportionate share in whatever royalty is obtained 
by the executive in the lease negotiation. However, the
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fractional share royalty interest, which is entitled to its fixed 
fractional share regardless of the size of the lease royalty, is 
protected by the "utmost fair dealing" standard of the prudent 
landowner test.97
Mims v. Beall98 is an illustrative case. In that case, the 
plaintiffs owned a l/4th of non-participating royalties with John 
Mims and his wife, Chattie, owning the executive right. The 
Mimses executed an oil and gas lease to their son, Angus Mims, 
that provided for no bonus and a l/8th royalty. Subsequently, 
five months later, Angus Mims assigned the lease to a third-party 
in return for a l/16th overriding royalty. Plaintiffs, 
contending that the l/8th royalty in the Angus Mims lease was 
unreasonably low, sued John and Chattie Mims and Angus Mims for 
damages occasioned by the breach of the duty owed by the 
executive to the non-executive in the Mims to Mims lease.
Finding that the "duty of good faith and fair dealing" was 
breached, the trial court awarded actual damages against the 
Mimses. Also, for "participating in the breach," the court 
assessed actual damages against Angus Mims. A constructive trust 
was imposed on the non-participating royalty owner's share of the 
overriding interest in the third-party lease. Further, finding 
that both parties acted in an "unconscionable, willful and wanton 
manner and in total disregard of the plaintiffs' rights" 
exemplary damages of $2500 were assessed against the Mimses and 
$5000 against Angus Mims.
On appeal, both defendants argued that no fiduciary 
relationship between the Mimses and Beall existed. The Court 
rejected that argument and held that the fiduciary standard of 
Manges applied because the exercise of the executive right 
"controlled" the amount of royalty that the fraction of non- 
participating royalty interest receives under the lease. The 
executive violated the fiduciary obligation in executing the Mims 
to Mims lease in several respects: engaging in "self dealing" 
which includes parents dealing with a son; failing to negotiate 
at arms length for current market terms; and, as consequence of 
the self-dealing, the son's overriding royalty interest reserved 
in the third-party lease was treated as if it were owned by the 
parents, resulting in the executives having exacted a royalty 
share for themselves which was not shared with the non- 
participating royalty owner. The award of actual and exemplary 
damages against the executives, the Mimses, as well as the 
imposition of the constructive trust on the overriding interest, 
was affirmed.
The Lessee's Liability for Inducing or Participating 
in the Breach of the Standard of Care
Mims v. Beall is instructive on the potential for a lessee
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to incur liability in the leasing transaction in which the 
mineral owner with the executive right violates the requisite 
standard of care owed to the non-executive interest. Angus Mims, 
the son, the lessee to the lease in which the executives, his 
parents, violated the fiduciary duty to the non-participating 
royalty owners, did not owe a fiduciary duty to the non- 
participating royalty owners. However, the lessee was liable to 
the non-executive interest for "knowingly participating" in the 
breach of the executive duty. Thus, the award of actual and 
exemplary damages against the lessee was affirmed. Further, the 
executive who breaches the standard of care owed to the non-
executive and the lessee who induces or participates in that 
breach are jointly and severally liable.
The general rule of liability for the lessee who takes a 
lease from an executive subject to a non-executive interest was 
stated in Mims v. Beall;
"So long as the lessee maintains an arm's length 
position in the transaction, he does not owe a 
fiduciary duty or a duty of utmost good faith to the 
owner of the non-executive interest. If, however, the 
lessee agrees with the executive to an arrangement made 
for the purpose of excluding or minimizing the benefits 
of an outstanding or non-participating interest owner, 
the lessee can be held liable to the injured third 
party."99
Thus, if the lessee either "induces" the executive to breach the 
standard of care or "knowingly participates" in the breach, i.e., 
agrees with the executive to an arrangement for the express 
purpose of lessening the non-executive's lease benefits, the 
lessee is liable to the non-executive interest.
More importantly, the Court indicated that the lessee may 
also be liable if he should reasonably have been aware that the 
executive was acting in breach of his duty. As to this basis of 
liability, the Court further noted that the fact that the non- 
participating royalty deed is recorded puts the lessee on 
constructive notice of the existence of the non-participating 
royalty owner.
One lesson of Mims v. Beall is that the lessee can avoid 
liability while negotiating a lease from a mineral owner burdened 
by a non-participating royalty owner. The fundamental premise of 
the decision is the lessee does not owe a fiduciary duty or a 
duty of utmost fair dealing to the non-participating royalty 
owner. So long as the lessee maintains the negotiations with the 
executive owner at arms length, and secures a lease from the 
executive that are competitive with current market conditions, 
including the royalty prevailing in the area, the lessee should 
avoid liability.
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What the lessee cannot do is to "induce" the executive to 
violate the duty of care owed to the non-participating royalty 
owner. "Induce" clearly encompasses "planting the seed in the 
mind" of the executive that the two should cut a deal that 
breaches the duty. However, the mere offer of a lower than 
prevailing royalty and a higher than customary bonus as a special 
incentive for the executive to grant the lease may well 
constitute "inducement" and incur liability. Also, the lessee 
cannot "knowingly participate" in the executive's perpetration of 
the breach of the duty on the non-executive. The lessee cannot 
agree with the executive to a royalty share that has the express 
purpose of excluding or lessening the non-participating royalty 
owner's royalty share.
What is unsettling about Mims v . Beall is the dicta that 
indicates that the lessee may be liable if he should have 
reasonably been aware that the executive was acting in breach of 
his duty. The lessee's knowledge of the existence of the non- 
participating royalty interest may be based on constructive 
notice that is based on the non-participating royalty deed being 
recorded. Thus, if a lease is taken on the basis of a 
superficial title search which does not determine the existence 
and extent of non-participating royalty interests, but only 
focuses on the ownership of the executive right, the lessee, if 
the dicta ultimately prevails as law, may be found liable to the 
non-participating royalty owner for agreeing to such lease terms 
as an unusually low royalty or an overriding royalty interest 
that expressly denominated in the lease as bonus.
Conclusion
Non-participating royalty interests should incite caution to 
the lawyer and the landman. The difference between a fraction of 
and a fractional share royalty interest involves a distinction 
with a difference. Older royalty conveyances have created a 
wealth of interpretation problems and array of inconsistent and 
often puzzling case law. Care must be exacted in construing 
royalty deeds to determine if a fraction of or a fractional share 
royalty has been conveyed. Finally, the duty that the mineral 
owner owes to the fraction of non-participating royalty owner in 
negotiating the oil and gas lease is becoming more stringent in 
its substantive content and more drastic remedies are available 
for its breach. Even though the lessee owes no duty to the non- 
participating royalty owner in the lease negotiations, care must 
be exercised to avoid "inducing" or "knowingly participating" or 
"should have known that you were participating" in the 
executive's breach to avoid the imposition of liability, 
including the possibility of punitive damages and lease 
cancellation.
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ENDNOTES
1. A non-participating royalty interest may be created by grant 
or by reservation. To facilitate the discussion, the terms will 
be used interchangeably.
2. A non-participating royalty interest may be for a fee, term 
or defeasible term. For a discussion of term and defeasible term 
royalty interests, see, Norvell, "Defeasible Term Mineral and 
Royalty Interests", 24th Annual Arkansas Natural Resources Law 
Institute (1985). Also, for an examination of the non- 
participating royalty deed form that has been traditionally 
utilized in Arkansas, see, Clegg, "The Arkansas Royalty Deed: 
Questions and Answers," 21st Annual Arkansas Natural Resources 
Law Institute (1982).
3. Wvnn v. Sklar, 254 Ark. 232, 493 S.W.2d 439 (1970); Hanson v. 
Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 274 S.W.2d 359 (1955); Ark. Valley Royalty 
Co. v. Ark-Okla. Gas Co.. 223, Ark. 213, 258 S.W.2d 51 (1953).
4. 2 H. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, § 372.1 (1991).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Barret v. Kuhn. 264 Ark. 347. 572 S.W. 347, 572 S.W. 135 
(1978); Helms v. Guthrie, 573 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) 
reh’g denied.
8. Williams v. Meyers, supra n. 2 at § 327.2.
9. Id.
10. Ernest E. Smith, Conveyancing Problems, State Bar of Texas 
Professional Development Program, Advanced Oil, Gas and Mineral 
Law Course G-l (1981).
11. Miller v. Speed. 248 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). See 
also, Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 431, 274 S.W.2d 359, 361, 
wherein the granting clause to a 1919 royalty deed conveyed a 
"one-sixteenth part of all oil and gas produced and saved."
12. Karaker v. Unknown Heirs. 434 P.2d 282 (Okla. 1966). In 
Karaker, the Court was construing a reservation in a 1924 deed. 
The sole issue was whether the reservation reserved a l/16th of 
gross production or only a 1/16 of a l/8th royalty. The Court 
found the reservation ambiguous. Moreover, the court admitted 
into evidence a 1926 oil and gas lease that provided that the 
lease royalty was to be divided (1/2) equally between the grantor 
and grantee of the deed. The court held that the reservation was
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to a l/16th of gross production as a non-participating royalty.
In reaching this result, the Court emphasized that the 
reservation stated 1/16 royalty of any oil and gas produced, as 
opposed to 1/16 of any royalty interest, noting that a 
distinction exists between the term "royalty" and "royalty 
interest."
13. Caraway v. Owens, 254 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953, 
appeal with error refused, reh'q denied.
14. See, Helms v . Guthrie, 573 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) 
wherein dicta noted that a grant of "one-fourth (l/4th) of the 
royalty" conveyed a "fraction of royalty" and the ultimate share 
of production accruing to the interest was "determinable upon the 
execution of some future lease." Id. at 857. The grantee received 
l/4th of the l/8th lease royalty as well as l/4th of l/16th of 
the 7/8 overriding royalty reserved in a subsequent oil and gas 
lease.
15. "It is accepted convention that "of" is the same as times in 
a multiplication formula". W.D. Masterson, Jr., 6 Oil & Gas 
Reporter 1372 (1956), discussing Minchen v. Hirsch, 295 S.W.2d 
529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), writ of error refused.
16. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Square Enterprises, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) reh'g denied.
17. Schlitter v. Smith. 101 S.W. 2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
18. Nourse v. Kovacevich. 109 P.2d 999 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
19. Helms v. Guthrie, 575 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), 
reh'g denied. In Helms, the grantee in the deed sued to recover 
a l/16th share of a l/16th of 7/8ths overriding royalty interest 
that had been reserved in the lease in addition to the l/8th 
royalty share. In Texas, as noted in the case, overriding royalty 
is royalty. The Court held that Helms was only entitled to a 
l/16th of gross production. The Court observed that "Helms owns a 
'fractional royalty' of l/16th of total production, not a 
'fraction of royalty,' determinable upon the execution of some 
future lease."
20. Ernest E. Smith, supra n. 16 at G-l.
21. Id. at G-2.
22. Canter v. Lindsey. 575 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) 
reh'q denied.
23. To facilitate the discussion, the parties will be, as in the 
appellate court opinion, referred to as the principals, Lindsey, 
Roberts, and Mabee, as opposed to their successors-in-interest.
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24. To facilitate the understanding of the case, the calculation 
of the lease royalty shares pursuant to the theories of the 
different claimants appears below.
Lindsey, the plaintiff, claimed a 1/4 of the 3/16 royalty, 
or 3/64 of gross production. He recognized the defendant, Mabee, 
as owning 3/4 of 3/16 or 9/64ths of gross production while 
Roberts, the intervenors, pursuant to his theory, was entitled to 
no royalty.
Mabee, the defendant, claims it is entitled to all royalty 
reserved under any lease in excess of l/4th of l/8th (1/32nd), 
with the ownership of the 3/16th lease royalty lease being as 
follows: Lindsey, l/4th of l/8th = l/32nd share of gross 
production and Mabee, a full 3/16th minus Lindsey's 1/32nd share, 
entitling him to 10/64ths. Roberts, again, was entitled to no 
royalty.
Roberts, the intervenor, claimed l/4th of any royalty in 
excess of l/8th reserved on any lease (l/4th of l/16th, or 
l/64th). She recognized Lindsey was entitled to l/32nd of gross 
production and Mabee was entitled to 3/4ths of 3/16th or 9/64ths 
of gross production.
25. 575 S.W.2d at 331.
26. See, Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1957) which was 
cited in Canter v. Lindsey at 575 S.W.2d 331,334 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1978) .
27. The Court notes that Roberts conveyed a 3/4th mineral 
interest to Mabee. As to the remaining l/4th mineral interest 
she conveyed to Mabee the executive right, the right to bonus and 
delays. Thus, she owned the l/4th mineral interest short of the 
executive, delay rentals, bonus and a l/8th of royalty. Note 
that despite the fact that most of the incidents of ownership of 
her l/4th non-participating mineral estate, deprived of bonus, 
delay rentals, and l/8th royalty, she only shares in any benefits 
of mineral ownership in the event the lease royalty is in excess 
of l/8th.
28. In Remuda Oil Co. v. Wilson. 264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ, App. 
1954), reh'g denied, the Court construed a royalty deed that 
granted a l/4th of non-participating royalty as conveying only a 
l/4th of l/8th royalty. The l/4th of royalty deed contained, 
following the legal description, a clause referring to a prior 
deed "for all purposes." The prior deed was the source of the 
grantor's title that reserved to the grantor only an "undivided 
1/2 of l/8th royalty." Subsequently, an oil and gas lease was 
executed providing for a variable royalty, a l/4th royalty that 
under certain circumstances would increase to a 7/16ths royalty. 
The holding that the l/4th of royalty deed conveyed only a l/4th 
of l/8th royalty was based on: (1) the usual lease royalty is a 
l/8th royalty share; and (2) it would be unjust to construe the 
deed to convey a l/4th of royalty when the grantor only owned a
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1/2 of l/8th royalty, which is less than a l/4th of royalty share 
to the potential 7/16th lease royalty. Therefore, the reference 
to the prior deed "for all purposes" referred to the 1/2 of l/8th 
royalty share owned by the grantor and disclosed the intention to 
convey to the grantee l/4th of that l/8th royalty.
Although Remuda Oil Co. is the converse case, a l/4th of 
royalty is being construed as a l/4th of l/8th royalty, the 
decision is representative of an instance in which specific 
language in a deed, though not uncommon, or unusual 
circumstances, may result in an interpretation of fractional 
share or fraction of royalty that differs from the traditional 
construction of such deeds or reservations.
29. 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980), reh'q denied.
30. The royalty to be paid on the pre-existing gas well was also 
an issue. Havard alleged that Brown was also only entitled to 
l/16th of the proceeds from the gas well. Brown contended that 
he was entitled to 1/2 of the gross production from the gas well 
and 1/2 of the 3/8ths royalty from the M-Tex well. The jury, 
based on extrinsic evidence, held that Brown was entitled to 
l/16th of the production from any well. The trial judge, finding 
the deed unambiguous, entered a Judgement notwithstanding the 
verdict or (JNOV) that held that Brown was entitled to 1/2 of the 
production from the gas well and 1/2 of the 3/8ths royalty from 
the M-Tex lease. The Court on appeal held the the deed was 
ambiguous, in part, because Brown was awarded 1/2 of gross 
production from the gas well but only 1/2 of the 3/8ths royalty 
from the M-Tex wells. The dissent rejected the view that the 
difference in the trial judge's award as to the share of 
production from the gas well and the oil wells as a basis finding 
an ambiguity. The dissent noted that Havard was the operator and 
owner of the gas well and, more importantly, the judge's verdict 
as to the 1/2 share of gross production from the gas well was 
derived from a pre-trial stipulation made by the parties that 
agreed to that division of the production from that well.
Because of the stipulation as to the division of the gas well 
production, my analysis of the case will only consider the issue 
as to the division of the 3/8ths M-Tex lease royalty in order to 
facilitate and simplify the discussion.
31. The specific language of the majority opinion on the 
possible construction of the parenthetical phrase, "Being equal 
to, not less than an undivided l/16th," is as follows:
"The parenthetical language itself is subject to more 
than one interpretation. One interpretation is that 
the parties intended to reserve 1/2 of the conventional 
l/8th royalty, "being equal to" a l/16th. The 
additional phrase "not less than" insured that the 
reservation was 1/2 of the conventional l/8th royalty,
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and if the royalty were reduced, the Browns would still 
receive their l/16th. On the other hand, the 
parenthetical language can be construed, as urged by 
the Browns, to reserve 1/2 of the royalties contained 
in future leases, providing further that such share 
must not be less than l/16th. Such a construction must 
ignore the presence of the "comma" between the phrase 
"Being equal to" and the phrase "not less than an 
undivided l/16th." 539 S.W.2d at 942.
32. Id. at 946.
33. See, Ernest E. Smith, supra n. 10 at G-4.
34. 263 Ark. 731, 567 S.W.2d 295 (1978).
35. Id. at 263 Ark. 731, 733. 567 S.W.2d 295,296.
36. 237 Ark. 869, 377 S.W.2d 47 (1946).
37. Harris v. Ritter. 154 Tex. 474, 279 S.W.2d 845 (1955); 
Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945) reh’g 
denied.
38. For a discussion of the Duhig rule of mineral conveyancing, 
see, Willis H. Ellis, Rethinking the Duhig Doctrine, 28 Rocky Mt. 
Min. L. Inst. 947 (1982).
39. 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986), reh'g denied.
40. Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1957), reh'g denied, provides another example of a large 
fractional share royalty. The case involved the construction of 
reservation of a 49 year term royalty in which the first clause 
provided:
"Grantor expressly reserves unto itself, its successors 
and assigns, a one-fourth royalty in all oil, gas and 
other minerals in and under or hereafter produced ...
"
The last clause of the reservation indicated that the grantor's 
reservation was non-participating as to the executive right, 
bonus and delay rentals. At the end of this clause was the 
following language:
"... but if oil, gas or other minerals be produced in 
commercial quantities, then Grantor, ... shall during 
the term and existence of such reserved royalty, have 
and receive one-fourth part of such oil, gas and other 
minerals so produced as a royalty." (Emphasis added).
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The successors-in-interest of the grantees, the plaintiffs, 
argued that the reservation created a l/4th fraction of royalty, 
as opposed to a l/4th fractional share royalty. Plaintiffs 
argued that if a "comma" after the language "so produced" and 
before the language "as a royalty", the words "so produced" would 
modify "produced in commercial quantities," and the words "as a 
royalty" would modify "one-fourth part of such oil, gas and other 
minerals. Thus, the construction would be "l/4th royalty part of 
production," or a l/4th of royalty. The Court observed that the 
"comma" could be inserted if necessary to arrive at the intent of 
the parties. However, reading the language at issue along with 
the entire reservation, the language was clear and unambiguous.
As to the grammatical construction, the Court noted that the 
words "so produced" and "as a royalty" followed the same sequence 
as their respective antecedents. Further, if the grantors were 
only to receive "l/4th of royalty, there would be no reason for 
the inclusion of the article "a" that immediately preceded the 
word "royalty." A l/4th fractional share royalty was reserved.
41. 683 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
42. The division order has historically authorized the purchaser 
of production, or the operator who disburses the proceeds of 
production, to receive the production and to distribute the 
proceeds from the sale pursuant to the specified division of 
interest. Traditionally, if the proceeds are distributed 
pursuant to the division of ownership interest specified in the 
executed division order, an interest owner is estopped to assert 
a claim against the purchaser or operator for an inadequate 
payment. Dale v. Case. 217 Miss. 298, 64 So.2d 344 (1957); Exxon 
Corp. v. Middleton. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). See, also, 4 
Williams and Meyers, supra n.2 at § 704.5 for a citation to other 
authorities.
In Gavenda the Supreme Court of Texas is holding that the 
estoppel arising from reliance om the division of ownership 
interest specified in the division order only precludes liability 
when the overpayment is made to a third-party and is not retained 
by the party disbursing the proceeds of production.
43. The "subject to" and "future lease" clauses and the problems 
of interpretation resulting from conflicting fractions appearing 
in the various clauses, typically arising from a misunderstanding 
of the difference between a mineral and a royalty estate, 
including an analysis of the Texas cases and the infamous "two 
grant" or "multiple grant" constructions, have been the subject 
of a number of law review articles. See, Laura H. Burney, The 
Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed 
Construction, 34 S.Tex.L.Rev. 73 (1993); Tevis Herd, Deed 
Construction and the "Repugnant to the Grant" Doctrine, 21 Tex. 
Tech.L.Rev.635 (1990); Bruce Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of 
Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases, 24 Tex. Tech. L. Rev.
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Ernest E. Smith, The "Subject To" Clause, 30 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. 
Inst. 15-1 (1985).
44. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
45. Harris v. Currie. 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943), reh'q 
denied.
46. Heven v. Harnett, 235 Kan. 117, 679 P.2d 1152 (1984), a 1984 
Kansas Supreme Court case, best illustrates the problem. The 
Court was construing a 1925 mineral deed in which the granting 
clause conveyed a l/16th mineral estate and the subject to clause 
provided:
"if the land is covered by a valid mineral lease, the 
grantee ...shall have an undivided 1/2 interest in the 
Royalties, Rentals, ... ."
Plaintiff, the successor-in-interest of the grantee, argued that 
the deed was unambiguous, conveyed a l/16th mineral interest, as 
specified in the granting clause, that only entitled the 
defendants, the successors-in-interest of the grantees, an 
undivided 1/16 of the royalties to a subsequent lease. The 
plaintiff further argued that the "subject to" clause only 
provided for 1/2 of royalties if the land was then subject to an 
existing oil and gas lease, and, because their was no such lease, 
that contingency failed, rendering that clause inapplicable to 
convey any interest in royalties under subsequent leases. The 
defendant argued that the deed was ambiguous and conveyed a 1/2 
mineral estate entitling them to 1/2 of the royalties to be paid 
under the subsequent lease. Finding the deed ambiguous, 
admitting extrinsic evidence that indicated that the parties had 
subsequently treated the conveyance as conveying a 1/2 mineral 
estate, the Court held that the deed conveyed a 1/2 mineral 
estate. In so doing the Court made the following observation:
"It is not uncommon for parties to mineral deeds or 
reservations, where a royalty or mineral interest is 
conveyed or reserved subject to an existing oil and gas 
lease, to confuse the fractional interest conveyed or 
reserved.
"As the most common leasing arrangement provides for a 
one-eighth royalty reserved to the lessor, the 
confusion of fractional interests stems primarily from 
the mistaken premise that all the lessor-landowner owns 
is a one-eighth royalty. In conveying minerals subject 
to an existing lease and also assigning a corresponding 
fractional interest in the royalties received, mistake 
is often made in the fraction of the minerals conveyed 
by multiplying the intended fraction by one-eighth.
Thus, if a conveyance of an undivided one-half of the
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minerals is intended, the parties will multiply 
one-half by one-eighth and the instrument will 
erroneously specify a conveyance of one-sixteenth of 
the minerals upon the assumption that one-sixteenth is 
one-half of what the grantor owns. An ambiguity is 
created because the instrument will also show that the 
conveyance of one-sixteenth of the minerals is meant to 
entitle the grantor to one-half of the royalty. Of 
course, an undivided one-half of the minerals is needed 
to carry one-half of any royalties reserved." 235 Kan.
117, 124, 679 P .2d 1152, 1158.
47. The "two grant doctrine" originated in the early Texas case 
of Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Comm. 
App. 1925) in which 90 acres in fee were severed by deed from a 
366 acre tract that was subject to an outstanding oil and gas 
lease. The "subject to" clause in the deed provided, inter alia, 
that the grantee was to receive "1/2 of all oil royalty and gas 
rental or royalty due to be paid under the terms of said lease." 
(Emphasis added.) The Court construed the deed as executing two 
conveyances. One was the conveyance of the 90 acre tract in fee. 
The second conveyance, effectuated by the "subject to" clause, 
conveyed 1/2 of the royalties under the existing lease as to the 
entire 366 acre tract. The Court reasoned that the "subject to" 
clause covered 1/2 of the royalty from the "said lease" and was 
not restricted to royalties accruing from production on the 90 
acre tract. The construction in Hoffman has been universally 
condemned. The likely intent of the parties in inserting the 
"subject to" clause was to avoid Caruthers to ensure that the 
grantee received 1/2 of the rentals and royalties as to the 90 
acre tract that was conveyed. It seems unlikely that the parties 
would have utilized the "subject to" clause to convey 1/2 of the 
royalties under the entire 366 acre tract.
For a discussion of the origin and applicability of the 
"subject to" clause, including Hoffman and the "two grant" theory 
prior to Luckel v. White, discussed infra, see, Ernest E. Smith, 
supra n. 43. For a discussion that covers Hoffman and the Texas 
cases through Luckel v. White and Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, also 
discussed infra, see, Laura H. Burney, supra n. 43 at 89-105, and 
Bruce M. Kramer, supra n. 43 at 19-43.
48. Richardson v. Hart. 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945) 
reh'g denied, illustrates the applicability of the two grant 
doctrine. The Texas Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a deed 
with a the granting clause purporting to convey a l/16th of l/8th 
mineral interest and a subject to clause reciting that it "covers 
and includes 1/16 of 1/8 of all the oil royalty" conveyed two 
distinct grants. (Emphasis added.) The granting clause conveyed a 
l/16th of l/8th or a 1/128 minerals interest and the "subject to" 
clause also conveyed a 1/16 of l/8th of royalty or a l/1024th of 
gross production. The fact that the first grant, the 1/128th 
mineral interest, due to the existence of a lease with a l/8th
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landowner's royalty, would entitle the grantee to a 1/1024 share 
of production, which is the same as the royalty share granted in 
the subject to clause, was irrelevant as to the reality of the 
"two grants." Referring to the grant in the subject to clause, 
the Court observed:
The fact that it fixes the share in the present 
royalties the same as would have obtained by operation 
of law does not lessen its force and effect as a 
conveyance. As is often the case such payment of 
royalty might have been larger or smaller than a pro 
rata share. 43 Tex. at 393, 185 S.W.2d 564.
In addition to Richardson, the other "two grant" theory cases 
that appeared after Hoffman v. Magnolia, supra n. 47, are Benge 
v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex, 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953) and Woods v. 
Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954) which, like Hoffman, are 
factually unrelated to disparate fractions in the granting, 
"subject to" or "future lease" clause. For a discussion of these 
cases, see the citations at supra n. 47.
49. Garrett v. Dills Co., 299 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1957) is viewed 
by some commentators as a milestone case that departed from the 
"two grant" theory in favor of the "four corners" rule of 
construction. The case involved the misconception of the
difference between fractional shares of mineral and royalty 
interests. The granting clause purported to convey an "undivided 
l/64th interest in the minerals" while the subject to clause 
included "l/8th of any royalties and l/8th of said money rentals 
payable by the lessee." The future lease clause provided that 
the grantee would own
"l/8th of the lease interests and all future rentals 
..., he owning one-eighth of one-eighth of all oil, gas 
and other minerals...together with one-eighth interest 
in future rents."
The lease in existence expired and a subsequent lease was 
executed that provided for a l/8th royalty. The issue presented 
was whether the grantee was entitled to l/64th of royalty or a 
l/64th royalty share under the subsequent lease.
The Supreme Court in a divided opinion held, inter alia, 
that the deed conveyed a l/8th of the minerals entitling the 
grantee to l/8th of the royalty, or a l/64th royalty share. The 
majority construed the deed from its "four corners," viewing all 
of the clauses collectively, to ascertain the intent of the 
parties. First, the majority noted that the granting clause 
purported to convey a 1/64 mineral interest. However, the 
"subject to" clause indicated that the parties understood a 
l/64th of the minerals to embrace a l/64th royalty or l/8th of 
the l/8th royalty. The language of the "future lease" clause 
that the grantee would own l/8th of l/8th of the minerals
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reflected the intent to convey a l/8th of the royalty under 
future leases. Further, the language in the latter clause that 
the grantee acquired "l/8th of the lease interest and future 
rentals” indicated that the grantee had the right to lease an 
undivided l/8th interest and to receive l/8th of the bonus and 
rentals. In essence, the parties intended that the grantee was 
to share in the same royalty under future leases as the existing 
lease and was conveyed a l/8th mineral interest.
For a more detailed analysis of Garrett as applying the 
"four corners" rule of construction and, more importantly, 
rejecting the "two grant" theory, parties, see, Laura H. Burney, 
supra n.43 at 95-106.
50. 487 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
51. 671 S.W.2d 870 (1984), reh'g denied 1984.
52. Although the dissent did not elaborate on the "good reason," 
I would speculate that a l/16th mineral estate subject to a lease 
that yields (or may yield) a 1/16 of l/8th royalties may be of 
equal or greater value to an undivided 1/2 mineral estate after 
the lease expires when prospective royalties, or bonuses, are 
speculative.
53. The opinion also cited and endorsed Garret v. Dills, supra 
n. 49, 671 S.W.2d at 876.
54. See Burney, supra n. 43 at 93.
55. During its short reign, the rule was applied in two 
appellate cases. In Hawkins v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp., 724 
S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987), the granting clause conveyed a 
l/32nd fractional share royalty while the "future lease" clause 
specified a l/4th mineral estate. The granting clause conveyed a 
l/4th of l/8th royalty and the future lease provision specified a 
l/4th mineral estate upon termination of the existing lease. 
Alford was followed and the granting clause prevailed resulting 
in the deed only conveying a l/32nd royalty share. Hawkins 
provides a detailed and lucid account of the evolution of the 
"two grant" and "repugnancy to the grant" theories. In Stag Sales 
Co. v. Flores. 697 S.W.2d 493, the granting clause specified a 
1/2 of royalty while the "subject to" and "future lease" clause 
specified a l/16th royalty. The subsequent oil and gas lease 
provided for a l/6th landowner's royalty. Following Alford, the 
granting clause prevailed, thus, the deed conveyed a 1/2 of 
royalty entitling the grantees to a l/12th production share.
56. 819 S.W.2d 459 (1991), reh'g denied 1992.
57. The deed also contained a clause that recited that it was 
"understood... that Mayes is the owner of 1/2 of the royalties to 
be paid under the terms of the present existing lease, the other
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1/2 having been previously transferred by her to her children, 
and by the execution of this instrument, ... Mayes conveyed 1/2 
of her l/16th royalty now reserved by her." Id. at 461.
58. That conclusion that Luckel v. White represents a return to 
the "two grant" mode of construction by the Texas Supreme Court 
is reinforced by Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow. 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 
1991), reh'g denied (1992), a case decided the same day as 
Luckel. There, the issue involved the construction of a 1918 
mineral deed that had been executed when the land was then 
subject to an oil and gas lease providing for a l/8th royalty.
The deed contained a granting clause conveying a l/16th mineral 
interest and a "future lease" clause that provided, inter alia. 
that if the existing lease terminated without production, the 
"subject to" clause provided that the "grantee herein or his 
assigns "are to have ... under this conveyance an undivided 1/2 
of all the oil. [sic] gas or other mineral ... and it is the 
intention of the grantors herein that in the event said lease is 
forfeited, then in that event the grantee is to have and hold an 
equal undivided one half of all such minerals." Apparently, the 
lessee drilled a producing well on the assumption the deed only 
conveyed a l/16th mineral interest and the accounting as to a 
cotenancy would only be on a l/16th net profit basis.
Plaintiffs, the successors-in-interest to the grantee, arguing 
the deed conveyed a 1/2 mineral interest sought an accounting on 
a 1/2 net profits basis. The Court of Appeals, affirming the 
judgment of the trial court, applied Alford, and held that the 
deed, pursuant to the granting clause that controlled the 
inconsistent "subject to" clause, only conveyed a l/16th mineral 
interest. The Supreme Court reversed holding that the granting 
clause conveyed a l/16th mineral interest while the "subject to" 
clause simultaneously conveyed a 7/16 interest in the possibility 
of reverter in the mineral estate. Thus, when the existing lease 
expired, the grantee owned a fee 1/2 mineral estate. Thus, the 
lessee had to account on a 1/2 net profits basis. Although 
noting that the case had been overruled in Luckel, the Court in 
Jupiter Oil distinguished Alford on the basis the deed in Jupiter 
Oil unambiguously granted a l/16th fee mineral interest and a 
7/16ths interest in the possibility of reverter to the mineral 
estate.
To fully comprehend the "two grant" analysis, Jupiter Oil 
should be compared with the Heyen v. Harnett. 235 Kan. 117, 679 
P.2d 1152 (1984), wherein Kansas Supreme Court reached the same 
result on a different theory. Heyen is discussed at supra n . 46.
59. The Court opined that the only difference between the 
instrument in Alford and the deed in Luckel is that the former 
was mineral deed and the latter was a royalty deed and that was 
not a material distinction. Thus, deeds involving disparate 
mineral and royalty fractions are to be construed by the Luckel 
standard. Id. at 463.
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60. Id. at 466. The dissent is quoting from 4 Williams & Meyers, 
supra n. 2 at § 340.2.
61. 264 Ark. 347, 572 S.W.2d 135 (1978).
62. The Court referred to the clause as a "royalty" clause. 264 
Ark. at 136; 572 S.W.2d 136.
63. This reading of Kuhn is premised on the Court's articulating 
the issue as to whether the "l/8th of royalty" language in 
royalty clause permits the royalty owners to shale in "All 
royalty revenue" or the "usual l/8th royalty. Id. at 352.
64. 312 Ark. 330, 850 S.W. 302 (1993)
65. The opinion alternatively describes the royalty share at 
issue as an overriding royalty and as lease royalty share. I 
have assumed that for purposes of the discussion that the 3/16th 
share of royalty was a landowner's royalty share.
66. The Court also held that plaintiff's action was not time- 
barred. Thus, plaintiff was entitled to recover for the 
deficiency that accrued from the date of the execution of the 
division order in 1983. The statute of limitations applicable to 
division orders, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-111 (1987), that 
prescribes a five year limitations period for actions relating to 
written contracts, was tolled by the "partial payments," i.e. the 
underpayment.
67. See the discussion at supra n. 42.
68. For a discussion of the myriad instances in which the 
applicability of requisite standard of care that the executive 
rights owner owes to the non-executive interest holder, see, 
Williams & Meyers, supra n. 2 at § 339.
69. The same problem exists to grants or reservations of "all of 
the royalty," which encompasses all of the landowner's lease 
royalty. To facilitate the discussion as to the standard of 
care, the reference to the fraction of royalty includes the "all 
of the royalty" conveyancing phenomena.
70. A "naked" executive right, entitling the hold4er thereof to 
the development and leasing rights, may be severed in fee from 
the mineral estate without the executive rights holder owning any 
other interest in the mineral estate. The ownership of the non-
executive interest is to a "non-participating mineral estate." 
See, respectively, Richard W. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas,
§ 2.2 and § 2.7(H) (West 2nd. ed. 1992).
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71. Further complicating the applicability of the requisite 
standard of care the motivation of the executive holder to 
negotiate for a reduced royalty share may be to acquire a shorter 
primary term that may yield an additional leasing opportunity 
with another bonus or surface damages or non-development clauses. 
For a general discussion, see, Ernest E. Smith, Implications of a 
Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the Executive 
Right, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 371, 386-88 (1985).
72. An additional complication is that bonus, the consideration 
paid to the mineral owner for executing the oil and gas lease, 
need not be paid, as it typically is, as a cash payment. Any 
consideration may be paid as bonus, including a share of 
production, such as an overriding royalty interest or a 
production payment. When the lease benefits include a share of 
production, in addition to the landowner's royalty share, the 
issue is presented as to whether its bonus to be paid to the 
mineral owner or royalty to be paid to the royalty owner.
Two differing views exist in the case law. The Texas cases 
determine whether a share of production is bonus or royalty 
solely by whether the interest reserved has the characteristics 
of the generally accepted definitions of bonus or royalty. If 
the share of production is paid over the life of the lease, its 
royalty. If it is a sum certain to be paid out of production, it 
is a bonus. The parties' express designation as to whether the 
interest is bonus or royalty is not controlling. Thus, in 
Griffith v. Tavlor. 156 Tex. 1, 291 S.W.2d 673 (1956), the 
reservation in an oil and gas lease of a l/16th share of gross 
production to be paid over the life of the lease that expressly 
stated that it was "in addition [to] the royalties ..., as 
additional consideration and bonus royalty" reserved a royalty 
interest. See also, Lane v. Elkins. 441 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1969, reh'g denied. Texas has consistently held that the 
typical overriding royalty reservation in an oil and gas lease is 
royalty that is to be paid to the royalty owner.
In Oklahoma the parties designation in the lease as whether 
the interest is bonus or royalty is determinative. Therefore, the 
intent, not the characteristics of the interest reserved, is 
conclusive as to whether a production share, in addition to 
royalty, is bonus or royalty. The basis of the Oklahoma rule is 
Sykes v. Dillingham, 318 P.2d 416 (Okla. 1957), wherein the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a share of production in excess 
of a l/8th royalty intended by the parties to the lease to be a 
part of the consideration for the execution of the lease is 
bonus.
73. For a citation to the extensive literature on the duty that 
the executive owes the non-executive interest in negotiating the 
oil and gas lease, see, Joshua M. Morse & Jaimie A. Ross, New 
Remedies for Executive Duty Breaches: The Courts Should Throw 
J.R, Ewing Out of the Oil Patch, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 187, 188 n. 3 
(1988).
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74. For a discussion of the various labels used to describe the 
duty that the executive owner owes to the non-executive owner, 
see, William & Meyers, supra n. 2 at § 339.2. Many of the 
descriptive terms have been used interchangeably, such as the 
"utmost good faith," to describe the traditionally prevalent 
"prudent landowner" standard of the "utmost fair dealing" duty. 
Id. Differing opinions have been expressed over the years as to 
the appropriate duty to impose on the executive to adequately 
protect the non-executive interest. Suggestions have included 
the no duty rule, ordinary care and good faith, utmost fair 
dealing, and the fiduciary duty. Lloyd Lochridge, Abuse of 
Executive Rights, 36th Oil & Gas Inst. § 2.02 (Matthew Bender 
1985). For a criticism of the "utmost fair dealing" duty, and 
its "prudent landowner" standard, see, Joshua M. Morse and Jaimie 
A. Ross, supra n. 73 at 213-28.
75. 673 S.W.2d 180 (1984), reh'g denied.
76. The "same degree of diligence and discretion on the part of 
the mineral fee holder as would be expected of the average 
landowner ..." is from a leading and oft quoted "utmost fair 
dealing" case, Federal Land Bank v. United States. 168 F. Supp. 
788, 791 (Ct. Cl. 1958). The Court held therein, inter alia, that 
the unreasonable delay in leasing by the mineral owner which 
delayed production until after a term royalty interest had 
expired violated the "utmost fair dealing" standard. The 
standard originates from an eminent law review article in the 
Texas Law Review, Jones, "Non-Participating Royalty," 26 Tex. L. 
Rev. 569, 574. For a short historical discussion of the 
evolution of the "utmost fair dealing" standard, see Joshua M. 
Morse & Jaimie A. Ross, supra n. 73 at 213-18.
77. Joshua M. Morse & Jaimie A. Ross, supra n. at 9. Also, 
see, Loyd Lochridge, Abuse of Executive Rights, 36th Oil & Gas 
Inst. § 2.02 (Matthew Bender 1985) and 2 Williams & Meyers, supra 
n. 2 at § 339.2 at 210.7.
78. Federal Land Bank v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 781, 791 
(Ct. Cl. 1958) .
79. For the most common explication of the "prudent landowner" 
criteria of the "utmost good faith" standard, Williams v. Meyers. 
supra n. 2 at § 339.2.
80. Dean Ernest Smith notes that "As usually interpreted, utmost 
fair dealing requires the executive right holder to execute the 
same type of oil and gas lease on the same terms as he would have 
done in the absence of an outstanding non-participating interest 
in a third party." Ernest E. Smith, supra n. 71 at 371, 372.
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81. Dean Smith argues that the mineral owner should be free 
without liability under the prudent landowner standard to trade 
off a high bonus for a lower royalty, if the royalty is 
consistent with leasing practices in the area. Ernest E. Smith, 
The Standard of Conduct Owed by Executive Rights Holders and 
Operators to the Owners of Nonparticipating and Nonoperating 
Interests, 32 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. Tax'n, 241, 244 (1981 Matthew 
Bender).
82. Joshua M. Morse & Jaimie A. Ross, supra n. 73 at 229, 230.
83. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984), reh'g denied.
84. It is disputed as to whether Manges applied a "fiduciary 
duty" or the traditional "utmost fair dealing" standard. The 
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